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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the big data revolution has rapidly expanded from the private to the public sector. Today,
government authorities at all levels analyze mass amounts of digital data produced by citizens and use it to inform
their policy choices in such diverse areas as healthcare, education, transportation, and urban planning. Proponents
of this trend assert that it not only yields better policies, but also facilitates political participation by allowing more
people to influence governmental decisions at a low cost and with little effort.
This Article argues, however, that the political participation that big data analysis currently enables is flawed in
two main respects. First, such participation is usually passive and unintentional, and does not leave room for
public deliberation over contested issues. Second, the apparent neutrality of big data may obscure the systematic
exclusion of socioeconomically disempowered groups who do not produce digital data that can affect public policy.
To explicate these problems, the Article turns to the work of political philosopher Hannah Arendt, especially to
her conception of political action and speech and to her idea of the “right to have rights.” It then demonstrates
these problems in recent big data initiatives in the fields of healthcare and urban planning.
Finally, the Article asserts that in view of its participatory deficits, big data-based policymaking in its present
form may be incompatible with constitutional norms. It argues that under an uncommon yet plausible
interpretation, the First Amendment may be understood to establish the positive right of citizens to participate in
governmental policymaking in a manner that allows them to express reasoned opinions and engage in public
deliberation. It also argues that the Fourteenth Amendment may be understood to establish the right to equal
participation in policymaking of all segments of the population, including socioeconomically disadvantaged groups.
The Article explains how exactly these alleged constitutional rights apply to big data analysis and discusses some
measures that government authorities can take to meet their corresponding obligations without giving up the
efficiency advantages of big data-based policymaking.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past five years or so, the big data revolution1 has rapidly expanded
from the private to the public sector. Following in the footsteps of
commercial corporations that collect and analyze digital traces left by
customers in order to offer better services, develop new products, and
provide targeted advertising,2 federal and state authorities have begun to
collect and analyze digital traces left by citizens in order to improve public
policies.3 These digital traces are extracted from various sources, including
1

2

3

The term “big data” is commonly used to describe datasets containing massive amounts of
information, which is systematically analyzed to “detect patterns, glean insights, and predict
answers to complex questions.” See Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y: THINK
AGAIN (May 10, 2013, 12:40 AM), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/09/
think_again_big_data. The growing use of big data analysis is often described as a revolution not
only because it is enabled by advanced technologies, but also because it represents “a shift in
mindset about how data could be used,” which is gradually changing the face of many areas of
human endeavor. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 5–6 (2013).
See, e.g., BERNARD MARR, BIG DATA IN PRACTICE: HOW 45 SUCCESSFUL COMPANIES USED BIG
DATA ANALYTICS TO DELIVER EXTRAORDINARY RESULTS 1, 17, 69, 71 (2016) (describing
commercial uses of big data); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 675 (2012)
(noting that businesses use big data for diverse purposes such as targeted advertising, product
design, and traffic planning).
See, e.g., Ron S. Jarmin & Amy B. O’Hara, Big Data and the Transformation of Public Policy Analysis, 35
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 715, 715 (2016) (“Recent years have seen a growing number of uses
of novel ‛big data’ sources to monitor, improve, and study the delivery of public services.ˮ); Neil M.
Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 404–408 (2014)
(discussing the use of big data by government institutions); Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet:
Big
Data
Across
the
Federal
Government
(Mar.
29,
2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/04/fact-sheet-big-data-acrossfederal-government (describing federal big data projects); Tom Kalil, Big Data is a Big Deal, White
House
Archives:
President
Barack
Obama
(Mar.
29,
2012,
9:23
AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/03/29/big-data-big-deal (describing the
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social media sites, internet searches, smartphone applications, and global
positioning systems,4 and the insights that they generate inform policies in
such diverse areas as healthcare,5 urban planning,6 education,7 energy
saving,8 disaster management,9 social welfare,10 and crime control.11
The growing reliance of government authorities on big data analysis has
many advantages.
It offers the authorities better knowledge and
understanding of the habits and needs of those affected by their policy
choices, and allows them to make decisions that are based on updated,
comprehensive information.12 Some commentators argue that big data
thereby not only enhances policy outcomes, but also facilitates a new form of
mass participation in public affairs, which strengthens democracy, empowers
citizens, and enhances the legitimacy of government actions.13 According to

4

5
6
7

8

9

10

11

12

13

National Big Data Research and Development Initiative).
See, e.g., Gema Bello-Orgaz et al., Social Big Data: Recent Achievements and New Challenges, 28 INFO.
FUSION 45, 45 (2016) (listing various data sources); boyd & Crawford, supra note 2, at 663 (detailing
potential data sources).
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See, e.g., BARBARA MEANS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., USE OF EDUCATION DATA AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL: FROM ACCOUNTABILITY TO INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT (2010),
www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/tech/use-of-education-data/use-of-education-data.pdf
(describing
the systematic collection and analysis of information generated by and about students as a means
to improve educational policies).
See, e.g., KATHERINE DYKES ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ENABLING THE SMART
WIND POWER PLANT OF THE FUTURE THROUGH SCIENCE-BASED INNOVATION (2017),
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68123.pdf (describing the Department of Energy’s Atmosphere to
Electrons (A2E) program, which explores ways to improve wind power plants activity by using
innovative technology, including big data analysis).
See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE FEDERAL BIG DATA RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 8 (2016) (noting that the Department of Homeland Security
together with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the US Fire Administration are
using big data technologies to “deliver[ ] new insights on how to improve emergency training and
reduce losses”).
See, e.g., ERIKA M. KITZMILLER, ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE FOR SOC. POLICY, IDS CASE
STUDY: ALLEGHENY COUNTY’S DATA WAREHOUSE: LEVERAGING DATA TO ENHANCE HUMAN
SERVICE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 1 (2014), www.aisp.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/
08/AlleghenyCounty-_CaseStudy.pdf (describing how the Department of Human Services in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, aggregates and analyzes data from multiple sources to improve
its services).
See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE,
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2017) (describing how police departments
throughout the country use big data analytics to predict and investigate criminal activity).
See, e.g., Roger Stough & Dennis McBride, Big Data and U.S. Public Policy, 31 REV. POL’Y RES. 339,
339 (2014) (“[A]nalysis of ‘Big Data’ offers potentially to provide public sector policy makers with
extensive new information that would inform policy at unprecedentedly detailed levels.ˮ).
See, e.g., Thomas M. Philip et al., A Framework for Learning About Big Data with Mobile Technologies for
Democratic Participation: Possibilities, Limitations, and Unanticipated Obstacles, 18 TECH., KNOWLEDGE &
LEARNING 103 (2013) (suggesting that basic big data literacy facilitates democratic participation).
For a similar claim in the context of global governance, see Matthew Tenney & Renee Sieber, DataDriven Participation: Algorithims, Cities, Citizens, and Corporate Control, 1 URB. PLAN. 101 (2016)
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this view, the political participation that big data makes possible improves on
other methods of political participation—including notice and comment
procedures, closed discussions with relevant stakeholders, public hearings,
and open online consultations—in that it engages broader segments of the
population in government decision-making at relatively low cost.14
However, despite these potential advantages, political participation
through big data suffers from two main flaws.15 First, governmental big data
analysis usually relies on the reuse and re-adaptation of data that citizens
originally produced for other purposes.16 In these circumstances, the
contribution of citizens to the policymaking process is passive and indirect,
and they do not have sufficient control over the determination of their needs
and preferences and their translation into policy choices. Moreover, even in
cases where citizens produce digital data specifically for policymaking
purposes and communicate it directly to the government authority through
a designated platform, they hardly have an opportunity to express their views
about the policy issues at stake, let alone engage in reasoned discussion about
them. Their participation in the collective decision-making process thus
remains technical and schematic. This type of civic participation in public
affairs is referred to in this Article as “mild participation,” as opposed to deep,
deliberative forms of political participation.17
Second, participation in big data-based policymaking depends on the
production of relevant digital data. This means that people with lower
income and less education—who, according to empirical studies, produce
less digital data than others—might miss important opportunities to
participate in public affairs.18 Moreover, since big data is commonly believed
to be neutral, objective, and apolitical, this systematic exclusion can easily go
unnoticed and be left unaddressed.19 Hence, governmental reliance on big

14

15

16
17
18
19

(describing people’s contribution to large datasets of geographic information as a form of (imperfect)
civic participation).
See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What Role for the Law
of Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 56 (2018) (“The availability of big data and the fast and
relatively cheap means to process it are prompting public and private governance bodies to regard
the traditional bidirectional communications process as unnecessarily burdensome, if not
superfluous.”); Jonathan Bright & Helen Margetts, Big Data and Public Policy: Can It Succeed Where EParticipation Has Failed?, 8 POL’Y & INTERNET 218, 219 (2016) (asserting that the use of big data in
policymaking can offer a solution to the problems of low participation and high costs associated
with many online consultation initiatives).
Of course, big data-based policymaking suffers from many limitations, ranging from poor quality
of data to possible infringements on privacy and other human rights. See, e.g., infra notes 53–56 and
accompanying text. This Article, however, focuses on the problems directly associated with the
impact of big data on political participation.
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.B.

Feb. 2019]

BIG DATA AND THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

717

data analysis might create an “illusion of inclusion,” while actually
entrenching socioeconomic and political gaps.20
One might think that although the shortcomings of participation in
public affairs through big data analysis—namely, its mild nature and the
exclusion of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups—are disturbing, they do
not present such an urgent problem. After all, many governmental decisions
are still being made without resorting to big data, and other methods of
political participation such as public comments on suggested regulations and
online consultations on various policy questions remain pervasive. However,
this reality seems to be changing very rapidly. Taking into account the great
interest of U.S. government agencies in big data opportunities,21 as well as
the global trend towards big data-based policymaking,22 it seems safe to
assume that the big data revolution in the public sector is only beginning,
and it is here to stay.23
In view of this prediction, it is necessary to acknowledge and understand
the pitfalls of political participation through big data and to examine possible
ways to address them. In Part I, the Article begins this exploration by
elaborating on the sources and implications of the problems of mild
participation in and exclusion from big data analysis. Part II turns to the
work of political philosopher Hannah Arendt to offer a deeper theoretical
account of these deficiencies. It discusses Arendt’s conceptualization of
deliberate action and opinion as the fundamental building blocks of political
participation, as well as her claim that every person should have the right to
such political participation, which she defines as the “right to have rights.”24
While Arendt developed these ideas to explain the ramifications of the statecentered political order of the mid-twentieth century, this Article suggests
that with some adaptations, they can also be invoked to explore the
implications of big data-based policymaking in the globalized, datafied world
of the twenty-first century.
Part III demonstrates the problems of mild participation in and exclusion
from big data analysis in two preeminent domains of the public sector’s big

20
21

22

23

24

See infra Section I.B.
This interest has been stated clearly in a series of big data studies and reports published by the
federal government. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9; Press Release, White
House, supra note 3; Kalil, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Gang-Hoon Kim et al., Big Data Applications in the Government Sector, 57 COMM. ASS’N
COMPUTING MACHINERY, Mar. 2014, at 78, 83–84 (describing the increasing use of big-data
applications by the governments of technologically advanced countries).
See, e.g., PENN, SCHOEN & BERLAND ASSOCS., LLC, BIG DATA AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A
SURVEY OF IT DECISION MAKERS IN FEDERAL AND STATE PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS
(2014), www.splunk.com/pdfs/fact-sheets/sap-public-sector-big-data-report-final-2.pdf (reporting
that eighty-two percent of information technology decision makers in the federal and state
governments expect that the use of big data in the public sector is “the way of the future”).
See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
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data revolution, namely, healthcare and urban planning. It details several
governmental big data initiatives from recent years and shows that while
these initiatives promote policymaker consideration of citizens’ objective
health conditions and urban experiences, they do not offer citizens the
opportunity to present and discuss their subjective preferences and views
about related policy issues. It also shows that due to various technological,
financial, and mental barriers, members of socioeconomically disadvantaged
groups are less likely to contribute data to these projects. This means that
those who are in greatest need of public health and urban services may have
the fewest opportunities to affect them.
Part IV argues that in view of its participatory deficits, big data-based
policymaking in its present form may be incompatible with constitutional
norms. It notes that even though the right of citizens to participate in public
affairs is not explicitly embedded in any provision of the Constitution, it may
be understood to underlie the entire Constitution. Drawing on a latetwentieth-century body of scholarship that points to the influence of civicrepublican ideals on the Framers of the Constitution, Part IV suggests that
the First Amendment can be interpreted as placing upon the government a
positive duty to provide adequate opportunities for people to engage in
meaningful discussions over public affairs. Hence, to the extent that the
government relies in its decisions on the production, collection, and analysis
of big data, it must make sure that this process is as deliberative as possible.
One possible way to do this is to employ, and push forward the development
of, advanced artificial intelligence technologies that allow for the mass scale
automatic analysis of complex texts.
Part IV further examines whether the exclusion of socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups from governmental big data analysis could be deemed
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, either through the
Equal Protection Clause or through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It
notes that under the prevailing disparate treatment interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause, exclusion from big data analysis is likely to survive
judicial scrutiny. For one thing, it is hard to associate such exclusion with a
discriminatory intention. For another, socioeconomically disadvantaged
people are generally not considered a protected class.25 However, if the
Supreme Court ever accepts that the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits
unintentional disparate impact—as many commentators assert it should—
big data-based policies that disfavor socioeconomically disadvantaged
populations may be deemed unconstitutional.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause has
gained far less attention and has been invoked far more rarely than the Equal
Protection Clause, mainly because nineteenth-century judicial decisions
25

See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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interpreted it so narrowly that it became meaningless. In recent years,
however, legal scholars have convincingly argued that this Clause should be
interpreted more broadly as securing, inter alia, the right to equal and
effective participation in political life.26 This interpretation seems to entail
that all citizens should be able to equally contribute to governmental big data
analysis. Part V concludes by suggesting concrete measures that government
authorities can take in order to meet their purported duty under either the
Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause to promote
big data inclusiveness. The Conclusion summarizes the discussion.
I. THE PITFALLS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION THROUGH BIG DATA
A. Mild Participation
When public authorities engage in big data analysis, they can use two
types of digital data. The first type, which may be called “non-policyoriented big data,” is data that was originally created for other purposes and
which happens also to be useful for policymaking purposes. Such data is
usually produced without any intention to affect public policy and with no
reflection on its possible policy implications. Examples of non-policyoriented big data include patient medical records that federal agencies collect
from hospitals and then analyze to improve public health services,27 as well
as driver-to-driver communications that the departments of transportation
in several states draw from navigation applications and then use to improve
road planning and infrastructure.28
The second type of data that government authorities use, which may be
called “policy-oriented big data,” is created with the knowledge and specific
intention that it be collected and analyzed for particular policymaking
purposes. Examples of this type include reports about hazards, nuisances,
and other disturbances that city residents communicate directly to their local
authorities through various online applications. These reports are intended
to help the authorities solve immediate problems as well as improve urban
systems in the longer term.29
Most of the big data that public authorities currently use belong to the
first, non-policy-oriented type.30 While the analysis of such data can provide
26
27
28
29
30

See infra notes 231–45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 134, 138–41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 160–64 and accompanying text.
There seems to exist no comprehensive documentation of the big data sources currently used by
the government. However, in view of the fact that designated governmental big data platforms are
a relatively new phenomenon, and that most collectable digital data is currently produced under
the auspices of commercial companies, it seems safe to assume that most of the data that the
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decisionmakers with important insights concerning the habits and needs of
those affected by their choices, it does not give the latter sufficient control over
the translation of these habits and needs into policy choices.31 It allows for
the realities and experiences of large segments of the population to be
represented in the policymaking process, but it does not give those represented
an opportunity to sound their voices and express their perspectives on the
policy questions at stake. According to Nick Couldry, such denial of voice
and opinion undermines people’s humanity and agency, understood as the
ability to make rational decisions and be accountable for them.32
Moreover, participation that is based on the secondary use of non-policyoriented digital data does not allow for public deliberation over contested
issues, which arguably represents the ultimate form of political participation.
The idea of deliberative democracy suggests that in order to be legitimate,
public decision-making must represent something more than the simple
aggregation of individual interests or preferences;33 it must be the outcome
of authentic deliberation among those affected, which includes a joint search
for solutions to collective problems through the exchange of reasoned
arguments and proposals.34 Such deliberation enhances participants’ agency
and self-realization,35 and at the same time yields better decisions.36 It cannot
take place, however, when the contribution of people to the collective
decision-making process is unintentional and perhaps even unconscious.

31

32

33

34

35

36

government uses is non-policy oriented. It is noteworthy that some of the data analyzed by public
authorities has been produced for multiple purposes, both policy- and non-policy-oriented.
However, in order to simplify the discussion, data sources are divided here into only two types.
As Nick Couldry puts it, big data analysis “aggregat[es] action-fragments from any moment in the
stream of a person’s recorded acts into patterns that bear little relationship to how those people
themselves understand the sequence and meaning of their actions.” Nick Couldry, Inaugural: A
Necessary Disenchantment: Myth, Agency and Injustice in a Digital World, 67 SOC. REV. 880, 889 (2014).
NICK COULDRY, WHY VOICE MATTERS: CULTURE AND POLITICS AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 1, 8
(2010); Nick Couldry & Alison Powell, Big Data from the Bottom Up, BIG DATA & SOC’Y July–Dec.
2014, at 1, 1–2.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548–49 (1988) (noting
that the deliberative approach to politics assumes that public discussion can transform and refine
individual preferences, which should not be taken as exogenous to politics).
See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 4
(2004) (describing deliberative decision-making as “a process of structured reasoning in which
[people] offer proposals and arguments to one another”); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic
Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17, 21 (Alan Hamlin and
Phillip Pettit eds., 1989) (asserting that citizens regard their democratic institutions as legitimate
insofar as they establish an appropriate framework for public deliberation).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 36 (1985)
(noting that under the antifederalist approach, public deliberation is considered to provide “a kind
of ‘happiness’ that [can] be found nowhere else”).
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 302–314 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) (contending that
democratic legitimacy stems from the combination of formal and informal public deliberation that
enhances rational policymaking).
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These problems are somewhat mitigated when the government uses big
data of the second type, which people create with the clear intention of
informing policymaking processes.
However, even in these cases,
participation usually falls short of being sufficiently deliberative and
empowering. Most of the information that people transfer to government
authorities for big data analysis purposes is technical, and sometimes it is
generated in a semi-automatic way (for example, when people operate a
cellular application that automatically reports certain activities). This kind
of data sharing does not leave room for the expression of complex views or
for substantive discussion. It gives people the opportunity to directly affect
public policy, yet this influence does not amount to deep engagement in the
democratic process.
Hence, whether participation in public affairs through big data is
intentional or unintentional, direct or indirect, it seems fair to describe it as
soft, latent, or “mild” form of political participation. The question therefore
arises whether big data platforms, whose main feature and advantage is their
high volume, could ever be more deliberative and empowering than they
currently are, or the increase in quantity essentially comes at the expense of
quality. The answer to this question depends to a large degree on the
availability of advanced artificial intelligence technologies that allow for
rapid and reliable analysis of complex information on a large scale.37 Such
technological developments, in turn, may be affected by political and legal
incentives of the kind discussed in the following Parts of this Article.
B. Exclusion of Disadvantaged Groups
Deliberative models of political participation emphasize not only that
people should have appropriate opportunities to express their views and
exchange reasoned arguments concerning collective affairs, but also that these
opportunities must be equal, so that all those affected can take part in the
process.38 This brings us to the second problem with political participation
through big data, namely that some people in society produce far less digital
data than others and therefore make a smaller contribution, if any, to big databased policymaking. In particular, digital data is scarcer when it comes to
people with lower income and less education, as well as elderly people.
37
38

See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 70 (Seyla Benhabib ed.
1996) (arguing that legitimate public deliberation must be governed by the principle of equality);
Cohen, supra note 34, at 21 (holding that free deliberation among equals is the basis of democratic
legitimacy); Jürgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the Public Sphere (Thomas Burger trans.), in
HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 421, 449 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) (asserting that
deliberation requires “the inclusion of all parties that might be affected”).
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Although these characteristics correlate to some degree with race, ethnicity,
and gender, empirical studies suggest that the “digital divide” revolves mainly
around level of income and education, or socioeconomic status.39
In fact, in the context of big data-based policymaking the problem of the
digital divide is twofold. First, members of socioeconomically disadvantaged
groups have less access to digital devices, technologies, and networks than
members of more privileged groups.40 Hence, many poor, uneducated people
do not meet the basic physical conditions necessary for generating digital
information. Second, even when they do have digital access, people located
low on the socioeconomic scale do not always have the mental resources that
enable the creation of digital content that can be relevant for public
policymaking.41 Digital activities such as navigating, searching online
information, or reporting hazards through designated government applications
require a certain sociocultural orientation as well as some technical skills, which
less educated people may not possess.42 As others have observed, the digital
39

40
41

42

For example, a comprehensive survey conducted by the Pew Research Center shows that in 2018,
eighty-five percent of U.S. adults with less than a high school education did not use the internet,
sixteen percent of adults with only high school education did not use the internet, and only seven
percent of adults with some college education did not use the internet. At the same time, nineteen
percent of adults from households earning less than $30,000 a year did not use the internet, whereas
less than two percent of adults from households earning more than $75,000 a year did not use the
internet. In addition, twenty-two percent of rural adults and 8 percent of urban adults did not use
the internet. Finally, thirty-four percent of Americans aged sixty-five and older did not use the
internet, compared with only two percent of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds. The survey also
shows that the gaps between men and women as well as between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics are
much milder, with twelve percent of women, thirteen percent of Blacks, and twelve percent of
Hispanics not using the internet, compared to eleven percent of men and eleven percent of Whites.
Monica Anderson et al., 11% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are They?, PEW RES. CTR., (Mar.
5, 2018), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internetwho-are-they. According to the Pew survey, the same variables (educational attainment, household
income, community type, and age) also correlate with ownership of mobile devices as well as with
the usage of social media (Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, LinkedIn, and Twitter). See Mobile Fact
Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile; Social Media Fact
Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media.
See Anderson, supra note 39; Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 39; Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
See, e.g., Christian Pieter Hoffmann et al., Content Creation on the Internet: A Social Cognitive Perspective on
the Participation Divide, 18 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 696, 701–702 (2015) (arguing that young, highly
educated males produce more digital content than others because of their higher self-efficacy and
lower concern for privacy); Jen Schradie, The Trend of Class, Race, and Ethnicity in Social Media Inequality:
Who Still Cannot Afford to Blog?, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 555, 567 (2012) (emphasizing the need
to acknowledge the class-based constraints that are unique to active production, as opposed to
passive consumption, of digital content).
For example, Hargittai and Hinnant show that people with higher levels of education and of a more
resource-rich background are likely to use the Web for more “capital-enhancing” activities—such
as arranging for travel, seeking health information, researching products, and banking—whereas
those with less education and income are more likely to use the internet for entertainment. Eszter
Hargittai & Amanda Hinnant, Digital Inequality: Differences in Young Adults’ Use of the Internet, 35 COMM.
RES. 602, 602 (2008). Arguably, the activities that Hargittai and Hinnant define as “capitalenhancing” are more likely to be used for big data analysis than the activities they classify as
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divide in the Web 2.0 era is based not only on simplistic notions of access, but
also on the ability to use technology in meaningful ways.43
Some scholars contend that the digital divide is diminishing as cellular and
internet services become more affordable and younger people who were born
into the digital era replace older generations.44 A few of them invoke the
“diffusion of innovations” theory to claim that information and
communication technologies are likely to reach near-universal use that crosses
all sectors of society, as did the television and (fixed) telephone in their time.45
However, the twofold nature of the digital divide suggests that the rumors of
its death may be premature.
Unlike the television or telephone,
contemporary digital technologies are emerging and changing rapidly,
thereby maintaining a persistent gap between those who have the skills and
resources that facilitate adaptation and those who do not.46 It seems, then,
that unless the underlying causes of the digital divide are effectively addressed,
it will continue to exist and bear implications for those who are left behind.
One might further argue that even if big data-based policymaking may
exclude disadvantaged groups who do not produce relevant digital data, it is
still more inclusive of such groups than other policymaking methods, and

43

44

45

46

entertaining, which means that according to their findings, educated and wealthy people have
better chances to be represented in such analysis. See also Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in
Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 964–967 (2006) (arguing that the main
barriers to citizens’ participation in administrative decision-making are cognitive and motivational).
Michael Crutcher & Matthew Zook, Placemarks and Waterlines: Racialized Cyberscapes in Post-Katrina
Google Earth, 40 GEOFORUM 523, 533 (2009); see also Paul Dimaggio et al., Digital Inequality: From
Unequal Access to Differentiated Use, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 355 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004)
(emphasizing that social factors affect not only formal access to the internet but also the ability of
people to use such access in a meaningful and effective way).
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 17 (2007) (noting that “in both the domestic and
the international context, that problem [the digital divide] seems likely to diminish over time, as new
technologies, above all the Internet, are made increasingly available to people regardless of their
income or wealth”); Andrew Power, Governance, Social Media, and the Cybercitizen—Always in Motion Is the
Future, 10 SCRIPTED 231, 238 (2013) (asserting that the digital divide based on age is diminishing).
According to the diffusion of innovations theory, the process of the social adoption of technological
innovations often begins with a small, privileged group of “innovators” and “early adopters,” and
then moves on to “early majority,” “later majority,” and “laggards.” See EVERETT M. ROGERS,
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 282–85 (5th ed. 2003). Applied to the context of ICTs, this theory
leads techno-optimists to believe that, given that access to computing and communication
technologies is “growing with a record speed,” the digital divide is a temporary phenomenon. See
ILKKA TUOMI, DIGITAL DIVIDES IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 1 (2003).
See Crutcher & Zook, supra note 43, at 533 (contending that the digital divide should be seen as “a
dynamic and constantly shifting gap in the use of digital resources caused by structural issues that
can not be successfully bridged by technology alone”); Sabina Lissitsa & Azi Lev-On, Gaps Close,
Gaps Open: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Study of the Scope and Determinants of the Ethnic Digital Divide, 7 INT’L
J. ELECTRONIC GOVERNANCE 56, 56 (2014) (showing that even when access differences between
groups diminish, a “ ‘second-level’ digital divide of social media usage” may persist); Jan A.G.M.
van Dijk, Digital Divide Research, Achievements and Shortcomings, 34 POETICS 221, 221 (2006) (asserting
that while in terms of physical access the digital divide seems to be closing, in terms of digital skills
and the use of applications, the divide persists or is widening).
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that it should therefore be celebrated rather than criticized by those
concerned about participation in politics. Admittedly, when policymakers
make decisions on the basis of their own intuition or judgment, yield to the
pressures of strong interest groups, or follow some other decision-making
logic that is insulated from public scrutiny,47 they are more likely to disregard
the interests of disempowered groups than when they rely on big data
analysis.48 Moreover, even when policymaking involves “traditional”
participation mechanisms such as notice and comments, public hearings, or
online consultations, it is likely to be less inclusive than big data-based
policymaking, which allows many more people to contribute to the decisionmaking process.
The problem, however, is that big data can easily create an “illusion of
inclusion” that makes the exclusion of disempowered groups go unnoticed.49
As some scholars have noted, many people believe that big data is inclusive
and neutral and that it offers “objective and universal insights into patterns
of human behavior.”50 Of course, decisionmakers who rely on big data may
have an interest to cultivate this perception of big data,51 as it helps them

47

48

49

50

51

See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 42, at 945 (noting that “[p]rior to the advent of modern information
technology, unelected regulatory officials made significant policy decisions through a process largely
insulated from the general public”); Daniel Esty & Reece Rushing, The Promise of Data-Driven
Policymaking, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 2007, at 67, 69 (noting that “[i]n the absence of good
data, policymaking frequently relies on intuition, past experience, or expertise,” and all are
susceptible to cognitive and emotional biases).
See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA (2012) (detailing the increased responsiveness of American politicians toward
the political concerns of affluent citizens); Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political
Representation, in THE UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATE 167, 167 (Lawrence Jacobs & Desmond
King eds., 2009) (noting that wealthier and better-educated citizens are more likely to vote, have
well-informed preferences, and have direct contact with public officials).
The problem of the “illusion of inclusion” was identified in the context of public participation in
governmental decision-making through public hearings, written comments, etc. It has been argued
that such participation may pay lip service to democratic values while actually having little impact
on decision-makers’ choices. See, e.g., Roger Few et al., Public Participation and Climate Change
Adaptation: Avoiding the Illusion of Inclusion, 7 CLIMATE POL’Y 46, 53 (2007) (observing “a common
tendency for pre-existing power relations to persist in participatory fora despite the claims that they
promote bottom-up decision-making”); Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, Reframing Public
Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century, 5 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419, 419 (2004) (noting that the
methods of participation in governmental decision-making prescribed by U.S. laws—in particular
public hearings, review, and comment procedures—fail to achieve genuine participation).
Crawford, supra note 1; see also Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific
Method Obsolete, WIRED: SCI. (June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory
(“With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.”).
See, e.g., Jen Schradie, Big Data Not Big Enough? How the Digital Divide Leaves People Out, MEDIASHIFT
(July 31, 2013), http://mediashift.org/2013/07/big-data-not-big-enough-how-digital-divideleaves-people-out/ (arguing that in the past, those who focused on elite groups did not pretend that
they represented all of society, whereas “[u]sers of Big Data . . . imply that this information does
include all ‘citizens’”).
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obscure or at least depoliticize the disregard of vulnerable groups.52
Arguably, such misconceptions make governmental reliance on big data no
less dangerous to democratic values than other, less inclusive, decisionmaking methods whose exclusionary elements can at least be more easily
discerned and criticized.
Another factor that may draw public attention away from the problem of
exclusion from big data is the preoccupation of lawyers, scholars, and human
rights activists with the risks that big data analysis poses to those who are
included in digital databases, especially the risks of invasion of privacy,53 mass
surveillance,54 cybercrime,55 and algorithmic discrimination.56 It seems that
the intensive interest of big data critics in the rights of people who are caught
in the big data net has led them to overlook the deprivation of those who are
left behind.57 However, in view of the expansion of big data analysis to the
public sector, which means that big data outsiders may be denied not only
52

53

54

55

56

57

See, e.g., Lawrence Joseph & Frank Pasquale, Interview on the Black Box Society, BALKINIZATION (Sept.
19,
2004),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/09/interview-on-black-box-society_19.html
(asserting that big data “is touted as a way to understand and control society without reference to
the history (or patterns of thought) that gave rise to the data analyzed”).
See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 156 (asserting that “[i]n the era of big
data, the . . . core strategies long used to ensure privacy . . . have lost much of their effectivenessˮ);
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2014), https://bigdatawg.nist.gov/
pdf/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf (noting that traditional technologies used to
protect privacy can no longer be relied upon); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy
and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 263–270 (2013)
(suggesting regulatory measures to address privacy concerns arising from big data).
See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 150 (noting that everyday activities like
the use of credit cards or cellular phones put people under constant surveillance); boyd & Crawford,
supra note 2, at 664 (contending that big data can be seen “as a troubling manifestation of Big Brotherˮ).
See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, with a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2007),
www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/20tele.html (reporting that companies specializing in
compiling big data sold personal financial information to “known lawbreakers”); Bruce Schneier,
Stealing
Fingerprints,
VICE:
MOTHERBOARD
(Sept.
29,
2015,
11:25
AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/read/stealing-fingerprints (discussing the possible implications of
fingerprint theft).
See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673
(2016) (arguing that algorithm-based hiring decisions might discriminate against protected groups);
Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the MachineLearning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1191–1205 (2017) (discussing the discriminatory potential of the
use of machine-learning algorithms by administrative agencies); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 634 (2017) (presenting a technological toolkit to help ensure that
automated decision-making complies with basic standards of fairness and antidiscrimination).
There are, however, some shorter pieces that discuss the problem of exclusion from Big Data. See,
e.g., Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2013) (discussing the
threats that Big Data poses to those who remain at its periphery); Schradie, supra note 51
(highlighting the “Big Data Gap” and its relation to socioeconomic status); see also Charly Gordon,
Big Data Exclusions and Disparate Impact: Investigating the Exclusionary Dynamics of the Big
Data Phenomenon (2014) (unpublished MSc dissertation, London School of Economics and
Political Science) (on file with author) (exploring digital exclusion in the private sector).
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market opportunities but also the ability to influence public affairs, it is high
time to take this problem seriously and find ways to address it.
II. HANNAH ARENDT’S ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
In the opening of The Human Condition, political theorist Hannah Arendt
offers her reflections on scientific and technological innovations and their
relation to political life. Writing in 1958, Arendt describes the major
scientific achievements of her time—the launch of the space satellite Sputnik
I, the splitting of the atom, and the fertilization of a human egg in a test
tube—as clear manifestations of “the tremendousness of human power and
mastery.”58 At the same time, though, Arendt identifies the dangers
associated with these achievements. Her main concern is that the “truths”
of modern science “will no longer lend themselves to normal expression in
speech and thought.”59 Since speech and thought are the features that
distinguish human beings from other animals and define them as political
creatures,60 their loss might turn people into no more than human animals,61
who live “at the mercy of every gadget which is technically possible.”62
Science and technology have developed immensely since Arendt wrote
The Human Condition, but her observations seem to be as relevant as ever. In
the context of the big data revolution, these observations suggest that while
governmental deployment of big data technology can greatly enhance
administrative efficiency and productivity, it may also alienate people who
do not speak big data’s “language” from the domains it governs. This
alienation may be reflected in mild public participation in these domains, or
even in no participation at all. Section II.A connects Arendt’s theory to the
first risk, and Section II.B to the latter.
A. Arendt on Political Action and Deliberation
A question that preoccupies Arendt throughout her work is, what does it
mean to belong to a political community? Following the Greek philosophers,
Arendt asserts that the human capacities of action and speech are the

58
59
60

61
62

HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 1 (2d ed. 1998) (1958).
Id. at 3.
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 377 (Shocken Books 2004) (1951)
(noting that “man, since Aristotle, has been defined as a being commanding the power of speech and
thought . . . and . . . has been thought of as the ‘political animal,’ that is one who by definition lives in
a communityˮ); see also ARENDT, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that men as political beings “can experience
meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselvesˮ).
See ARENDT, supra note 58, at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
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fundamental building blocks of the political sphere.63 Arendt defines action
by distinguishing it from two other types of human activity, namely labor,
which satisfies basic biological needs such as nutrition and reproduction,64
and work, which produces artificial objects that can last longer than human
beings themselves.65 Action, by contrast, is a superior activity of public
interaction between people.66 Whereas labor and work take place within the
private (or social) sphere, action can only take place within the public (or
political) sphere. 67
Closely related to action is speech, understood as a means of expression
and persuasion through words.68 For Arendt, political life is about free
discussion and debate among people, through which they define joint goals
and strive to achieve them.69 Such public deliberation allows people to see the
world from other people’s perspectives, and thereby to better understand it.70
According to Arendt, this is “the political kind of insight par excellence.”71
At the same time that action and speech constitute political life, they are
also indispensable for the realization of our personality.72 “In acting and
speaking,” Arendt explains, “men show who they are, reveal actively their
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human
world.”73 Whereas the products of labor and work disclose what a person
does, action and speech show who she is.74 In Arendt’s view, “one’s creations
do not fully embody who one is.”75 Accordingly, “dignity . . . pertains to a
63
64
65
66
67
68

69
70

71
72

73
74

75

Id. at 24–26; see also id. at 198 (“[T]he political realm rises directly out of acting together, the ʻsharing
of words and deeds.ʼ”).
Id. at 7, 79–109.
Id. at 7, 136–75.
Id. at 7, 175–81.
Id.
Id. at 26. With respect to the relationship between action and speech, Arendt notes that already in
pre-Socratic thought, speech and action were considered to belong together, and that “this
originally meant not only that most political action . . . is indeed transacted in words, but more
fundamentally that finding the right words at the right moment, quite apart from the information
or communication they may convey, is action.” Id. at 25–26.
See Shmuel Lederman, Agonism and Deliberation in Arendt, 21 CONSTELLATIONS 327, 327 (2014).
HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE OF POLITICS 18 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2005); see also id. at 128
(noting that the world shows itself differently to different persons and is “comprehensible only to
the extent that many people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and perspectives with one
another, over against one another”).
Id. at 18.
According to Arendt, personality and politics are closely interrelated. In her view, “personality is
anything but a private affair.” HANNAH ARENDT, Karl Jaspers: A Laudatio (Clara & Richard Winston
trans.), in MEN IN DARK TIMES 71, 72 (1958).
ARENDT, supra note 58, at 179
See TREVOR TCHIR, HANNAH ARENDT’S THEORY OF POLITICAL ACTION: DAIMONIC
DISCLOSURE OF THE ‘WHO’ 127 (2017) (interpreting Arendt’s concept of political action); see also
JULIA KRISTEVA, HANNAH ARENDT: LIFE IS A NARRATIVE 56 (Frank Collins trans., 2001) (noting
that Arendt’s “who”—as opposed to “that which”—is inevitably political).
TCHIR, supra note 74, at 35.
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man insofar as he is more than everything he does or creates.”76
Under the Arendtian distinction between who and what—between, on
the one hand, political action and speech that realize one’s personality, and,
on the other hand, pre-political labor and work that are constrained by
necessity and utility—participation in big data-based policymaking appears
to be located too close to the non-political side of the spectrum. As noted
above, the big data that policymakers use is typically produced by people for
non-policy-oriented purposes within the course of mundane activities such as
commuting, shopping, and communicating with family and friends.77 In
other words, such data is a creation of the private sphere that is reused for
public purposes. This transplantation, however, does not attach to big data
the superior virtues that Arendt attributes to real political action. Moreover,
even when big data is created for policymaking purposes in the first place, it
is usually technical and does not allow for genuine expression of complex
thoughts and opinions.78
Thus, whether or not big data is policy-oriented, its production and
analysis can hardly reveal the “unique personal identities” of its
contributors,79 nor can they facilitate a meaningful public discussion that
enables the participants to see reality from multiple perspectives and to find
creative solutions to collective problems.80 To use Julia Kristeva’s words, big
data does not have the “energeia that transcends deeds and [activities],” and
which resists “any attempt at reification or objectification.”81 Quite to the
contrary, big data reduces people’s needs, experiences, and thoughts to the
objectively measurable digital traces that they leave. In the world of big data,
a person is not “more than everything he does or creates,”82 but, rather,
precisely what he does or creates (provided that it has a digital aspect).
Hence, governmental big data analysis seems to represent a “modern
prejudice,” according to which “only the ‘objective work,’ separate from the
person, belongs to the public [sphere],” while the person herself—her
genuine thoughts, views, and feelings—remains in the shade.83
From an Arendtian point of view, then, contemporary methods of
contribution to governmental decision-making through big data either fail
completely to meet the minimum standards of political participation properly
so called, or, at best, represent a mild form of political participation that is

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
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ARENDT, supra note 72, at 72.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
See KRISTEVA, supra note 74, at 58.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
ARENDT, supra note 72, at 72.
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far from the ideal model of such participation. While it is true that this ideal
model may be impractical—even Arendt herself does not seem to believe
that a comprehensive public deliberation à la Greek polis could take place in
modern mass societies84—it should nevertheless be understood to represent
a goal to which contemporary democracies, including those that use big data
for policymaking purposes, should constantly aspire.85
B. Arendt on Political Exclusion and the “Right to Have Rights”
As noted above, for Arendt the value of public deliberation stems from
the fact that it allows people to exchange different opinions that emerge from
different positions.86 In other words, meaningful political participation
depends on the human condition of plurality.87 However, notwithstanding
the essential differences between people, in the public sphere everyone must
be considered equal.88 This equality is an artifact of political organization:
“[w]e are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the
strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”89
Not all people, however, enjoy the equal opportunities offered by the
public sphere. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt discusses the situation
of the paradigmatic outsider of her time—the stateless person.90 She notes
that during the first half of the twentieth century, millions of people who were
members of national minorities in their countries were expelled from their
homelands and lost their citizenship without being able to acquire a new one.
These people became stateless, lawless, and, consequentially, rightless.91
According to Arendt, this reality revealed the main paradox underlying the
idea of universal human rights: precisely when they were most needed, when
people who had lost everything but their humanity could rely on nothing but

84

85
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See ARENDT, supra note 58, at 43 (“Large numbers of people, crowded together, develop an almost
irresistible inclination toward despotism, be this the despotism of a person or of majority
rule . . . .”).
As Monika Bokiniec explains, the ideal of democratic participation presented by Arendt “is not to be
treated either as utopia, or as a concrete political project.” Monika Bokiniec, Is Polis the Answer?
Hannah Arendt on Democracy, 17 SANTALKA: FILOSOFIJA, KOMUNIKACIJA [COACTIVITY: PHIL.,
COMM.] 76, 80 (2009). Instead, it is “an idea to direct us towards reformation or complementation
of a system which failed to be democracy: [a] system, in which most citizens are not interested in
participating in politics, and professional politicians are not interested in them participating . . . .” Id.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
ARENDT, supra note 58, at 7, 175–6, 179.
Id. at 32–33. According to Arendt, the human condition of plurality means “living as a distinct and
unique being among equals.” Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
ARENDT, supra note 60, at 382.
See id. at 344–69.
Id. at 363–76.
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their “inalienable” rights as human beings, human rights proved to be an
abstract, unimplementable ideal.92
Arendt responds to the perplexities of human rights by introducing the
concept of the ‘right to have rights.’ She defines this right as a right “to live
in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions,”93 that is,
to have “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions
effective.”94 For Arendt, the right to action is no less important than the right
to be left alone, and the right to opinion is no less important than the right
to think whatever one pleases.95 This perception of rights turns away from
the liberal emphasis on negative individual freedom and focuses instead on
active engagement in public life.96 The right to have rights may thus be
understood as a right to politics.97 It is the right of every person to belong to
a political community in which she is recognized as an equal potential
partner to public deliberation over collective affairs.98
Legal scholars and social scientists have often invoked Arendt’s concept
of the right to have rights to explicate the plight of refugees and other people
whose formal legal status is contested.99 Arguably, however, this concept can
also shed light on the quandary of those who are formally considered equal
citizens, yet in practice are excluded from various aspects of public life that
are controlled by big data. While it is true that exclusion from big data does
not amount to losing one’s civil rights altogether and cannot be compared to
statelessness or refugeehood, nothing in Arendt’s account of the right to have
92
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Id. at 369–81.
Id. at 376.
Id. According to Seyla Benhabib, the first “right” in the “the right to have rights” refers to a moral
claim to membership in an organized political community, whereas the latter refers to the legal
rights of the members of such a community. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS:
ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 56–57 (2004).
ARENDT, supra note 60, at 376.
As noted by Jeffrey Isaac, “Arendt was a theorist of ‛positive’ rather than ‛negative’ liberty, one for
whom problems of political participation and civic agency occupied center stage, and for whom the
juridical strategies for limiting state power typically favored by liberals were not central.” Jeffrey
C. Isaac, A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights, 90
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 61, 61 (1996).
James D. Ingram, What Is a “Right to Have Rights”? Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights, 102 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 401, 408–413 (2008).
See ETIENNE BALIBAR, MASSES, CLASSES, IDEAS: STUDIES ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY
BEFORE AND AFTER MARX 212 (James Swenson trans., 1994) (referring to the “universal right to
political activity and recognition for every individual, in all the domains in which the problem of
collectively organizing possession, power, and knowledge is posed”); Ingram, supra note 97 at 410
(detailing Arendt’s emphasis on people serving as “equal partners in action and deliberation”);.
See, e.g., AYTEN GÜNDOĞDU, RIGHTLESSNESS IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS: HANNAH ARENDT AND THE
CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES OF MIGRANTS (2015); Chenchen Zhang, Between Postnationality and
Postcoloniality: Human Rights and the Rights of Non-Citizens in a ‘Cosmopolitan Europe,’ in DECOLONIZING
ENLIGHTENMENT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A
POSTCOLONIAL WORLD 243 (Nikita Dhawan ed., 2014).

Feb. 2019]

BIG DATA AND THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

731

rights suggests that it could only be applied to these radical situations. In
fact, Arendt herself recognizes that the problem of exclusion from public life
exists on a scale. Thus, for example, she observes that under the post-World
War I international legal order, members of national minorities who were
not expelled from their country and whose citizenship was not revoked were
nonetheless “half stateless”: they enjoyed elementary rights such as the right
to life and residence, yet other rights, especially their collective cultural rights,
remained in jeopardy.100 In the same vein, it is possible to argue that while
exclusion from big data does not necessarily entail absolute rightlessness, it
nevertheless places significant restrictions on people’s ability to enjoy equal
political rights.
People who do not contribute to big data miss important opportunities to
influence the public sphere. Their health problems do not affect public
health programs, their commuting patterns do not affect the planning of
urban transportation, their energy consumption habits do not affect
governmental energy policies, and their educational achievements do not
affect public schools’ curricula. While other people’s practices and
preferences increasingly shape public policies, theirs remain untraceable and
therefore irrelevant.
As noted above, the main concern of big data insiders (or of those who
speak on their behalf) is that their negative freedoms—especially their rights
to privacy, personal security, and freedom of thought—might be violated.101
By contrast, big data outsiders are deprived of the positive rights to action
and speech (compromised and mild as they may be); they can do whatever
they want, but nobody would notice, and they can say whatever they wish,
but nobody would listen. In this sense, the plight of big data outsiders
resembles that of stateless persons, whose main problem is not that they are
unable to exercise some civic rights, but rather that they are denied
“[s]omething much more fundamental than freedom and justice,”102 that is,
the right to politics, or the right to have rights. As Serena Parekh notes,
“[c]ivic rights, for Arendt, are . . . . the rights of man within a community”
(or, for that matter, within big data), whereas the rightless (or the big data
outsiders) “no longer belong to any community.”103
Again, this does not mean that big data exiles and stateless persons are
the same in all respects. However, in terms of political participation and
appearance in the public sphere, exclusion from big data in the twenty-first
century may turn out to be analogous to exclusion from the legal framework
100
101
102
103

See ARENDT, supra note 60, at 352.
See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
See ARENDT, supra note 60, at 376.
Serena Parekh, A Meaningful Place in the World: Hannah Arendt on the Nature of Human Rights, 3 J. HUM.
RTS. 41, 45 (2004).
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of the state in the twentieth century. According to Arendt, the main problem
of those who had lost the right to belong to an organized political community
in the previous century was that they could not regain it because, due to the
establishment of many new nation-states after the First World War, “there
was no longer any ‘uncivilized’ spot on earth.”104 Arguably, the same can be
said about big data exiles in today’s (and tomorrow’s) globalized, datafied
world. As big data-based decision-making is becoming popular in many
public domains, the opportunities to influence public affairs outside big data
are waning.105
To complete the analogy between stateless persons and big data
outsiders, it is worth mentioning Arendt’s discussion of the dramatic mask
and its metaphoric role in the political sphere.106 In the ancient Greek
theater, the dramatic mask had a double function: it hid the face of the actor,
but in such a way that his voice could pass through and be heard.107
According to Arendt, it is for this reason that the Latin word for mask—
persona108—is used in the legal language to denote the (artificial) legal status
of a (natural) human being who belongs to an organized political
community.109 The idea of a “legal personality,” Arendt explains, is that
when people act in the public realm, the law assigns to them a formal, equal
role of right-and-duty bearers, while also allowing each of theirs authentic
voices to be heard.110 Put differently, the mask of the legal personality
facilitates political participation and realization of human rights by covering
the faces of people, that is, the attributes with which they are born such as
104
105

106

107
108

109
110

ARENDT, supra note 60, at 376.
Jonas Lerman similarly observes that “politicians and governments may come to rely on big data
to such a degree that exclusion from data flows leads to exclusion from civic and political life—a
barrier to full citizenship.” See Lerman, supra note 57, at 59.
For another juxtaposition of the right to have rights and the metaphor of the mask, see generally
Leora Bilsky, Citizenship as Mask: Between the Imposter and the Refugee, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 72 (2008)
(discussing Israeli citizenship law in light of Arendt’s theory).
See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 106 (Penguin Books reprt. 1990) (1963).
The word persona is etymologically connected to the idea of sound (sona) projecting through (per)
the structure of the mask. See P. David Marshall & Kim Barbour, Making Intellectual Room for Persona
Studies: A New Consciousness and a Shifted Perspective, 1 PERSONA STUD. 1, 2 (2015) (tracing the
etymological origins of the Latin word “persona”).
See ARENDT, supra note 107, at 106–107.
Id. at 107; cf. NORMA CLAIRE MORUZZI, SPEAKING THROUGH THE MASK: HANNAH ARENDT
AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 26 (2000) (contending that the metaphor of the mask is
intended to propose that political action is always an assertion by a compromised, constructed
identity). In addition to the legal-political context, the idea that a metaphoric mask that covers
one’s face can help her sound her authentic voice and participate in public life has also been
examined in various psychological and artistic works, notably in Ingmar Bergman’s 1966 film
Persona, which presents an encounter between an actress that has ceased to speak and a caregiver
that represents many aspects of the actor’s personality. See, e.g., Marshall & Barbour, supra note
108, at 5 (noting that the persona is constructed in Bergman’s film as a way to negotiate one’s social
role and position).
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ethnicity or sex, so that these characteristics make no difference when they
speak and act in the public sphere.111 The public sphere, in turn, serves as a
“space of appearance,”112 a public stage that confers dignity and importance
upon the people that appear on it.113
Stateless persons, however, cannot enjoy the advantages of the political
mask. Deprived of the formal legal status of citizenship, they remain entirely
exposed, caught in the “abstract nakedness of being nothing but human.”114
They are treated according to their physical characteristics rather than their
actions and opinions.
Big data, just like citizenship and perhaps even more so, could arguably
function as an equalizing mask that hides people’s faces in a way that allows
them to sound their authentic voice. The digital environment could
potentially free people from identity attributes such as gender or race, which
are hard to conceal in the physical world.115 It can thus provide an
emancipatory space of appearance where the political influence of people is
determined by their actions and opinions and not by the characteristics that
define them at birth.116 Admittedly, in many cases anonymized digital data
can be de-anonymized,117 and even when data remains anonymized, it itself
or the algorithms applied to it might reproduce real-world biases.118
111

112
113

114
115

116

117

118

See Bilsky, supra note 106, at 74; see also GEORGE KATEB, HANNAH ARENDT: POLITICS,
CONSCIENCE, EVIL 10 (1983) (“Arendt presents the political actor as one who hides much in order
to reveal more. He wears a mask. But the mask in the ancient theater hid the face yet allowed the
actor’s true voice to come through. . . . [I]t is the highest responsibility of the citizen to protect his
mask so that in the artificial composure of his appearance the truth of his words may sound.”).
See ARENDT, supra note 58, at 199–207 (describing the political realm as a “space of appearance
between acting and speaking men”).
See Margaret Canovan, Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm, in HANNAH ARENDT:
CRITICAL ESSAYS, 179, 180 (Lewis P. Hinchman & Sandra K. Hinchman eds., 1994) (discussing
Arendt’s conception of the public realm).
ARENDT, supra note 60, at 380.
For an illuminating discussion of the ability to disrupt racial identities in cyberspace, either through
anonymity or through pseudonymity (cyber-passing), see generally Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2000). See also Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet: Espionage and
Counterespionage in the Internet Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 93 (2003) (arguing that by controlling and
managing the information that they provide online, people can construct their preferred digital
identity and thereby counteract discriminatory online profiling).
See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also BENHABIB, supra note 94, at 59 (“The right to have
rights can be realized only in a political community in which we are judged not through the
characteristics which define us at birth, but through our actions and opinions, by what we do and
say and think.”).
Computer scientists have shown that even when personally identifiable information is removed
from a database, it is possible to reidentify data subjects by combining apparently non-personally
identifiable information. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization
of Large Sparse Datasets, PROC. 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111; Latanya Sweeney,
Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely, (Carnegie Mellon Univ. Data Privacy, Working
Paper 3, 2000).
See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 56, at 677–93 (describing how data mining can reflect
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However, notwithstanding these misalignments, those who can get hold of
the big data mask are likely to have many more opportunities to affect public
affairs than those who have no access to this mask or no ability to use it. Like
their stateless twentieth century counterparts who were thrown out of the
nation-state system, the twenty-first century’s big data outsiders may find
themselves at the margins of an emerging global political order that is
increasingly shaped by big data analysis.
III. BIG DATA-BASED POLICYMAKING IN PRACTICE
A. Healthcare
Healthcare services in the United States suffer from a serious discrepancy:
U.S. health expenditures per capita are the highest in the world,119 yet life
expectancy in this country is lower than in most other developed countries.120
In view of this reality, improving public health and reducing health
expenditures is a major policy goal for the federal government.121 In order to
promote this goal, the Department of Health and Human Services and its
agencies have recently adopted several various big data projects intended to
enhance the efficiency of disease prevention and treatment.122 A brief

119

120

121

122

discriminatory real world practices); Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, & Gilbert B. Rodman, Race in
Cyberspace: An Introduction, in RACE IN CYBERSPACE 1, 4–5 (Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, & Gilbert
B. Rodman eds., 2000) (“[N]either the invisibility nor the mutability of online identity make it
possible for you to escape your ‘real world’ identity completely. . . . [A]ll of us who spend time
online are already shaped by the ways in which race matters offline . . . .”).
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2015: OECD
INDICATORS 164–67 (2015) (showing that health expenditures in the U.S. are the highest among
OECD countries both per capita and in terms of their share of the GDP).
Id. at 47 (showing that life expectancy in the U.S is lower than the average of OECD countries); see
also Ricardo Alonso-zaldivar, US Healthcare Spending Has Hit a New High—$10,345 Per Person, BUS.
INSIDER (July 14, 2016, 11:03 AM), www.businessinsider.com/ap-new-peak-for-us-health-carespending-10345-per-person-2016-7 (noting that national healthcare spending is expected to
continue to grow in the coming years); Lane Kenworthy, America’s Inefficient Health-Care System:
Another Look, LANE KENWORTHY: CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE (July 10, 2011),
https://lanekenworthy.net/2011/07/10/americas-inefficient-health-care-system-another-look/
(noting that the discrepancy between life expectancy and health expenditures has been an ongoing
trend in the United States since 1970).
See, e.g., Varun Chandola et al., Knowledge Discovery from Massive Healthcare Claims Data, PROC. 19TH
ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. 1312, 1312 (2013) (noting that healthcare spending is one of the key
issues targeted by policymakers in the United States).
See, e.g., Ronald Margolis et al., The National Institutes of Health’s Big Data to Knowledge (BD2K) Initiative:
Capitalizing on Biomedical Big Data, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 957, 957 (2014) (describing
the National Institutes of Health BD2K initiative, which funds big data research and development
projects); Basel Kayyali et al., The Big Data Revolution in US Health Care: Accelerating Value and Innovation,
MCKINSEY & CO. (April 2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-andservices/our-insights/the-big-data-revolution-in-us-health-care (discussing the government’s efforts
to facilitate big data analysis in the health sector); Press Release, White House, supra note 3 (listing
governmental big data initiatives in the health sector).
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description of three such projects may demonstrate this trend.
In 2013, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (the “CDC”)
launched the Epidemic Prediction Initiative, which aims to develop new
methods to predict the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases.123 While
the CDC has been tracking influenza activity for many years now, its
traditional surveillance system relies exclusively on clinical data provided by
medical institutions, and therefore lags behind real-time flu activity.124 By
contrast, the Epidemic Prediction Initiative supports the instantaneous
mining of flu-related data drawn from social media and internet search
engines.125 The combination of clinical and media data should enable the
CDC to forecast, rather than monitor, the activity of influenza.126 In the next
phase, similar prediction methods are planned to be applied to other
infectious diseases such as dengue fever and Ebola.127 According to the
CDC, the ultimate purpose of this project is to allow health officials to be
more proactive in their prevention and mitigation strategies.128
In 2014, the National Institutes of Health (the “NIH”) launched the Big
Data to Knowledge (“BD2K”) Initiative, whose purpose is to promote big
data-based biomedical research in the United States.129 BD2K focuses on
building large-scale biomedical datasets and developing relevant analysis
methods. Using these resources and methods, BD2K centers across the
country have already been involved in efforts to improve human
understanding of, inter alia, the factors responsible for brain diseases, the
dynamics of cardiovascular proteins, and the ways to optimize mobility in
individuals with movement disabilities.130
In 2015, the Obama administration announced the Precision Medicine
Initiative.131 The goal of this initiative is to improve the ability of healthcare
providers to customize disease prevention and treatment strategies to the

123
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125
126
127
128
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130
131

For an overview of the Epidemic Prediction Initiative, see the program’s website at About the Epidemic
Prediction Initiative, EPIDEMIC PREDICTION INITIATIVE, predict.phiresearchlab.org/about (last
visited Jan. 18, 2019).
See Overview of Influenza Surveillance in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Oct. 13, 2016), www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/weekly/overview-update.pdf (describing the current CDC
flu surveillance system, which relies on data from state, local, and territorial medical institutions).
See Flu Activity Forecasting Website Launched, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 19,
2016), www.cdc.gov/flu/news/flu-forecast-website-launched.htm.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Margolis et al., supra note 122 and accompanying text (presenting the BD2K Initiative).
For an overview of these projects, see BD2K Centers, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (last reviewed Sept. 5,
2018), https://datascience.nih.gov/bd2k/funded-programs/centers.
See Meg Tirrell & Cara Caruso, Obama Seeks $215 Million for Precision Medicine, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2015,
6:03
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/30/obama-seeks-215-million-for-precisionmedicine.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2015, 10:18 AM).
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specific characteristics of individual patients.132 As a first step toward this
goal, the Department of Health and Human Services is working to build a
national cohort of at least one million volunteers whose genetic,
physiological, and behavioral data will be integrated into a massive database
that will be made available to researchers and provide a platform for
precision medicine analyses.133
In terms of data sources, the three initiatives described above rely mainly
on electronic heath records (“EHRs”) collected from hospitals, medical
clinics, public health laboratories, and medical insurance companies, and
containing such data as imaging, laboratory test results, genetic information,
diagnoses, and medications.134 The initiatives also rely on social media
exchanges and internet searches,135 as well as on data produced directly by
patients who self-report their symptoms, pain scales, smoking habits, etc., or
who use mobile sensors that monitor their blood pressure, heart rate, glucose
level, etc.136 These sources are not unique to the initiatives discussed here;
they are the building blocks of many (probably most) current and prospective
healthcare big data projects.137
132

133
134

135
136

137

See PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE
COHORT PROGRAM: BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR 21ST CENTURY MEDICINE 6
(2015), www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-working-groupreport-20150917-2.pdf.
See id.
See, e.g., DP Hibar et al., Cortical Abnormalities in Bipolar Disorder: An MRI Analysis of 6503 Individuals
from the ENIGMA Bipolar Disorder Working Group, 23 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 932, 933 (2017)
(describing a research conducted by a BD2K center, which analyzed MRIs and other EHR data
to shed light on the physiology of bipolar disorder); Flu Activity Forecasting Website Launched, supra note
125 (mentioning the role of EHRs in the Epidemic Prediction Initiative); PRECISION MED.
INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., supra note 132, at 21 (noting that “[a] substantial source of health
data for the [Precision Medicine Initiative] cohort should derive from EHRs”).
See, e.g., Flu Activity Forecasting Website Launched, supra note 125 (explaining the role of social media
and internet searches in the Epidemic Prediction Initiative).
See, e.g., Santosh Kumar et al., Center of Excellence for Mobile Sensor Data-to-knowledge (MD2K), 22 J AM.
MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N. 1137, 1137 (2015) (describing the mission of a BD2K center that
develops tools to streamline the collection and analysis of data generated by mobile health sensors);
PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., supra note 132, at 21 (noting that in addition to
EHRs, the Precision Medicine Initiative cohort “will also include self-report data and the ability to
collect data from a number of other sources, such as sensors and mobile devices”).
See, e.g., Meredith A. Barrett et al., Big Data and Disease Prevention: From Quantified Self to Quantified
Communities, 1 BIG DATA 168, 169 (2013) (discussing the contribution of big data drawn from EHRs
and mobile health sensors to the prevention of chronic diseases); David W. Bates et al., Big Data in
Health Care: Using Analytics to Identify and Manage High-Risk and High-Cost Patients, 33 HEALTH AFF.
1123, 1123 (2014) (discussing EHRs’ big-data implications); Munmun De Choudhury et al.,
Predicting Postpartum Changes in Emotion and Behavior via Social Media, 2013 ACM ANN. CONF. ON HUM.
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSS. 3267, 3267 (2013) (suggesting that social media data can be used
to identify early signs of mental illness); Tao Huang et al., Promises and Challenges of Big Data Computing
in Health Sciences, 2 BIG DATA RES. 2, 4–5 (2015) (noting that mobile phones, social media, and data
from hospitals are the main sources of medical big data); Christian R. Macedonia et al., Advanced
Research and Data Methods in Women’s Health: Big Data Analytics, Adaptive Studies, and the Road Ahead, 129
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As we can see, most big data analysis in the healthcare sector relies on
the secondary use of non-policy-oriented data that was originally generated
for other purposes. Medical institutions store patients’ information in EHRs
in order to offer them more efficient treatment over time and to prevent the
loss of information.138 While the collection and storage of such information
as well as its reuse by government agencies usually requires patients’
consent,139 this consent does not mean that the patient undertook medical
examinations with the intention of affecting public policy or that she actually
contemplated possible policy implications. The same is true of spontaneous
searches for medical information on the internet and the sharing of such
information in social networks—people who engage in such activities do not
usually intend that it will serve for policymaking purposes. Finally, when it
comes to self-monitoring and direct reporting by citizens, the data analyzed
by health authorities is policy-oriented from the outset, yet it only includes
technical information (reporters’ smoking and drinking habits, blood
pressure, etc.), without any reference to related policy issues.
Hence, whatever the source of medical big data, its deployment for
policymaking purposes can offer data contributors no more than a mild form
of political participation. The collection and analysis process ensures that
policymakers take into account or at least be aware of contributors’
“objective” health conditions, yet it does not give the latter an opportunity to
present their views and insights about health policy questions. It assigns
weight to their physiological conditions and needs, but not to their thoughts
and ideas, and thus makes no room for their unique personalities to appear in
the public sphere and interact with each other. Put differently, contemporary
public engagement in health policymaking through big data does not seem to
meet Ardent’s basic requirements of meaningful political participation.
In any event, the situation of those who contribute technical information
to medical databases appears to be better than the situation of those who
cannot even enter the big data loop. Although the data sources used by
health authorities are quite diverse, many U.S. citizens are left outside them.
To begin with, millions of Americans cannot afford the costs of visiting

138
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OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 249, 249 (2017) (highlighting the importance of large-scale EHR
analyses in the field of gynecology); Sean D. Young, A “Big Data” Approach to HIV Epidemiology and
Prevention, 70 PREVENTIVE MED. 17, 17–18 (2015) (examining ways to use social media and mobile
technology data to address the HIV epidemic);.
See, e.g., David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electronic Health
Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 503 (2010) (noting that EHRs can improve the safety, quality,
and efficiency of care and help clinicians avoid preventable errors).
See, e.g., Peter B. Jensen et al., Mining Electronic Health Records: Towards Better Research Applications and
Clinical Care, 13 NATURE REVS.: GENETICS 395, 402 (2012) (noting that patients’ agreement to the
secondary use of EHR data is commonly obtained through an opt-in model as part of the standard
treatment consent form).
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hospitals and medical clinics, and therefore their medical data does not
appear in EHRs. In 2015, 9.1 percent of the U.S. population, or twentynine million people, had no health insurance.140 Though undoubtedly high,
this number nonetheless represents a significant decrease in the size of the
uninsured population following the enactment of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act in 2010 and the consequent expansion of Medicaid
eligibility in 2014.141 However, if the current administration’s plan to repeal
major parts of this Act is ultimately realized, the number of uninsured
persons is likely to rise again.142 Furthermore, even among people who do
have health insurance, representation in EHRs is not equal. One reason for
that is that large, technologically advanced medical institutions located in
economically developed areas make greater use of EHRs than smaller,
peripheral institutions that usually serve poorer populations.143
Arguably, those who cannot afford to see a physician and those who visit
hospitals and clinics that do not use EHRs could still contribute to some medical
big data projects by independently reporting their physiological and behavioral
conditions or by using automatic mobile health applications that monitor and
report such information directly to the relevant databases. Yet, although this
type of participation does not depend on one’s ability to pay for institutional
healthcare services, it does require other resources such as time, trust, and a
certain socio-psychological orientation. For example, in order to participate in
the national cohort created under the Precision Medicine Initiative, people are
required to monitor and share their health data and to provide biospecimens
over a period of at least ten years.144 Unfortunately, studies on civic
engagement show that people from a disadvantaged social background are less
likely to be committed to such a long-term voluntary project.145
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See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2015: CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 1 (2016).
See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, LONG-TERM TRENDS IN HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE: ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 1968–2016, at 4
(2017) (showing that the number of uninsured persons under the age of sixty-five dropped from
48.3 million in 2010 to 28 million in 2016); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 140, at 2
(attributing this drop to the enactment of the Affordable Care Act).
Repealing and replacing Obamacare was a central pledge of President Trump’s 2016 campaign and
his administration has invested many efforts to achieve this goal. While President Trump’s suggested
reform has so far failed to achieve sufficient support in Congress, it is still too early to declare it dead.
See, e.g., Obamacare Saved, But Just Barely, N.Y. TIMES: EDITORIALS, July 29, 2017, at A24.
See, e.g., Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 138, at 501 (noting that despite a broad consensus
regarding the potential value of EHRs, they are still unavailable in many medical institutions).
See PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., supra note 132, at 21.
See, e.g., J. Foster-Bey, Do Race, Ethnicity, Citizenship and Socio-economic Status Determine Civic Engagement?
1 (Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., Working Paper No. 62, 2008), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
ED505266.pdf (finding that the propensity to volunteer and to remain civically engaged over time
is confounded by income, education, race, ethnicity, and citizenship status).
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Finally, some medical big data projects rely on social media and internet
searches to analyze health-related practices and trends. Here too, the
conditions and needs of members of socioeconomically disadvantaged
groups are likely to be underrepresented. As noted above, poorer and less
educated people do not use the internet as much as wealthier people, and
even when they do, they may not use it to obtain or share information that
could be relevant for public policymaking, such as medical information.146
Hence, whether medical big data is extracted from institutional EHRs, selfmonitoring, or internet activity, members of disempowered groups are less
likely to participate in it. Consequently, the health needs of poorer populations
might have a smaller impact on the determination of public health policy than
the needs of other groups. This conclusion is particularly troubling in view of
the fact that poorer populations are generally less healthy and have a shorter
life expectancy than other populations. This is so not only because poorer
people cannot afford adequate healthcare, but also due to other factors such
as greater exposure to environmental hazards, more frequent workplace and
home injuries, and higher rates of smoking and drinking,147 which increase the
prevalence of chronic diseases and physical disabilities.148 This means that
those who are underrepresented in medical big data are precisely the ones who
have the greatest interest in its policy outcomes.
One may question the relevance and legitimacy of this discussion and
argue that even if socioeconomically disadvantaged people do not have equal
opportunities to affect big data-based health policymaking, this is probably
the last thing that concerns them. A person whose medical data does not
appear in EHRs because she does not have health insurance cares about
receiving immediate healthcare services, not about the negligible policy
implications of her absence from medical databases. Moreover, it could be
argued that focusing on the long-term policy implications of the exclusion of
disadvantaged populations from big data might turn public attention away
from the immediate hardships experienced by these populations. This
criticism, however, fails to acknowledge that an effective response to the
hardships of underserved populations must include not only immediate
remedies, but also long-term policy change, which cannot take place unless
these populations participate in the shaping of relevant policies, inter alia by
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See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fred C. Pampel et al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Behaviors, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 349,
350 (2010) (reviewing various explanations for unhealthy behaviors among low-status
socioeconomic groups).
See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Health Disparities and Inequalities Report—United States,
2013, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Nov. 23, 2013, at 1, 15 (observing that lower
socioeconomic position is associated with higher morbidity and mortality and mentioning
behavioral and environmental factors that account for this correlation).
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producing big data.149
B. Urban Planning
As the world’s population rapidly grows and urbanizes,150 adopting
advanced, data-based solutions to the increasing pressure on urban
infrastructure becomes an imperative.151 From China to Singapore to Abu
Dhabi to Spain, national and local governments around the world are
attempting to turn crowded cities into “smart cities” that use resources and
provide services in an informed, efficient, and sustainable way.152 The
United States is no exception. In the last couple of years, municipal
authorities across the country have launched numerous smart city projects,153
often with the support of the federal government.154 These projects use big
data analytics in order to save energy, reduce pollution, improve sanitation,
facilitate the flow of traffic, and offer overall better services to the residents.155
Smartphone applications are a major source of data for many of these
projects. For example, the departments of transportation in Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Oregon, and in several other states and
municipalities have recently entered into agreements with the crowdsourced
navigation application Waze, according to which Waze will share with them
traffic and road condition reports that it collects from drivers.156 The idea,
according to Waze, is to improve the day-to-day management as well as the
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See, e.g., Ursula E. Bauer & Marcus Plescia, Addressing Disparities in the Health of American Indian and
Alaska Native People: The Importance of Improved Public Health Data, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S255,
S255–57 (2014) (noting that data gaps pose an obstacle to creating health policies that adequately
address the particular health needs of the Native American population, such as extremely high rates
of diabetes and chronic liver disease).
The urban population of the world has grown from 746 million in 1950 to 3.9 billion in 2014 and
is expected to grow to 6.3 billion by 2050. See UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS,
WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 2014 REVISION 11 (2015). The United States is among
the most urbanized countries in the world, with about 265 million city dwellers in 2015, expected
to grow to 350 million by 2050. Id. at 225.
See id. at 3 (noting that “rapid and unplanned urban growth threatens sustainable development
when the necessary infrastructure is not developed”).
Smart cities may be defined as “places where information technology is combined with
infrastructure, architecture, everyday objects, and even our bodies to address social, economic, and
environmental problems.” ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC
HACKERS, AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW UTOPIA 15 (2014).
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FUTURE OF CITIES 8–27 (2016) (providing an overview of ongoing and planned smart city projects
in the United States).
See id. at 62–68 (describing major federal government smart city initiatives, including the 2013
Department of Commerce Smart America Challenge, the 2015 Department of Transportation
Smart City Challenge, and the 2015 White House Smart Cities Initiative).
Id. at 1–3 (summarizing the main goals of smart city projects).
See Connected Citizens Program, WAZE, https://www.waze.com/ccp (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
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longer-term planning of urban transportation.157
Another popular
smartphone application from which local authorities extract big data is
Strava Metro, which tracks users’ cycling activity and aggregates the data to
identify common cycling routes and times.158 Municipal authorities in
Portland, Seattle, Orlando, and other major U.S. cities use this data to
accommodate their road and transportation design to cyclers’ needs.159
In addition to the secondary use of non-policy-oriented applications like
Waze and Strava Metro, many local authorities also extract data from
designated smart city mobile applications. A famous example is Street
Bump, which has been developed and used by the City of Boston and is
expected to also become available to other cities. This application
automatically reports to the local authorities whenever a user drives over a
pothole,160 thereby allowing the authorities to make immediate repairs and
at the same time to better plan road infrastructure and maintenance.161
Another notable example is 311 applications that allow city residents to
report various types of hazards and impediments. Here, too, municipal
authorities use the reports both to solve immediate problems (e.g., fix a
sewage leak) and to improve relevant systems in the longer term (e.g.,
redesign sewage infrastructure on the basis of accumulated data).162
Another, relatively new, source of data for smart city analytics is personal
sensors. Such sensors are currently being used in several cities in Europe.
Such sensors are currently being used in several cities in Europe, including
Amsterdam, Barcelona, and Manchester. In these cities, some residents have
voluntarily installed on their apartments’ windows Smart Citizen Kits that
collect environmental data. The kit contains a board with several sensors
that measure air composition, light intensity, noise levels, and other
environmental data.163 This data is constantly streamed to a common
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158
159

160
161
162

163

See Ryan Bradley, Waze and the Traffic Panopticon, NEW YORKER (June 2, 2015),
www.newyorker.com/business/currency/waze-and-the-traffic-panopticon (detailing how Waze
aims to “improve some of [Los Angeles’] traffic and infrastructure systems . . . .”).
See How It Works, STRAVA METRO, https://metro.strava.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
See, e.g., Peter Walker, City Planners Tap into Wealth of Cycling Data from Strava Tracking App, GUARDIAN
(May 9, 2016, 3:26 PM), www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/may/09/city-plannerscycling-data-strava-tracking-app.
See Street Bump, CITY OF BOS., http://www.boston.gov/departments/new-urban-mechanics/streetbump (last updated Apr. 21, 2017).
See id.
See, e.g., City of Boston Apps: BOS:311, CITY OF BOS., https://www.boston.gov/departments/
innovation-and-technology/apps (last updated May 11, 2018); MyLA311, CITY OF L.A.,
https://myla311.lacity.org/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019); NYC311, CITY OF N.Y.C.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/311/index.page (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
See Smart Citizen: A Kit and Platform Which Engages Citizens in Solving Local Environmental Problems,
DIGITAL SOC. INNOVATION (Oct. 2016), https://digitalsocial.eu/case-study/9/smart-citizen (last
visited Oct. 26, 2018).
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platform that can be accessed by municipal authorities.164 Currently, it
seems, no U.S. local government is systematically extracting data from
personal sensor kits.165 However, several academic research groups have
received governmental funding to develop such systems. For example, a
group from the University of Michigan is developing the Sensors in a
Shoebox Kit, which can measure environmental parameters such as air
quality, humidity, and pedestrian traffic.166 The kits are planned to be
operated by high school students in the City of Detroit, who will be able to
learn about their neighborhoods and provide relevant data to decisionmakers.167 Another group of researchers from New York University is
developing advanced microphones that will be able to record and identify
various types of urban sounds, from the noise of an air conditioner to a dog’s
barking.168 Developers hope that these microphones will eventually be used
by New York City residents to understand noise pollution in their city and to
assist city officials in addressing the problem.169
Finally, some municipal authorities collect data from public sensors that
they themselves install and operate in public places. An example in point is
the Array of Things project implemented by the City of Chicago. Under this
project, the City of Chicago plans to install on traffic light poles across the
city five hundred sensors (nodes) that will measure weather conditions, air
quality, and pedestrian and vehicular traffic.170 Ultimately, this data will help
city agencies study and address critical city challenges such as improving air
quality and traffic safety and preventing urban flooding.171
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See Smart Citizen: About, SMART CITIZEN, https://smartcitizen.me/about (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
bkmk No relevant information was displayed when the Author searched on Google the terms
“city/urban” and “sensor” combined with the names of the fifty most populated cities in the United
States. The list of the most populated U.S. cities was taken from the World Population Review.
See US City Populations, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/
(last visited Feb. 6, 2019)
See U-M School of Education, College of Engineering Partner to Win Knight Cities Challenge Award, U.
MICHIGAN NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/23700-u-m-school-ofeducation-college-of-engineering-partner-to-win-knight-cities-challenge-award; see also Amy
Crawford, Detroit Imagines a Citizen-Led Smart City, CITYLAB (May 31, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/05/detroit-imagines-a-citizen-led-smart-city/528441/.
See Crawford, supra note 166.
See Emily S. Rueb, To Create a Quieter City, They’re Recording the Sounds of New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/nyregion/to-create-a-quieter-city-theyrerecording-the-sounds-of-new-york.html (“A group of researchers from New York University and
Ohio State University are training the microphones to recognize jackhammers, idling engines and
street music, using technology originally developed to identify the flight calls of migrating birds.”).
See id.
Press Release, Computation Institute, Chicago Becomes First City to Launch Array of Things (Aug.
29, 2016), https://ci.uchicago.edu/press-releases/chicago-becomes-first-city-launch-array-things
(“The first two nodes . . . will collect information on weather, traffic, and air quality.”).
See id.

Feb. 2019]

BIG DATA AND THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

743

In terms of civic engagement, all of the abovementioned smart city
initiatives seem to suffer from the dual chronic disease characteristic of big
data-based policymaking. First, these initiatives establish a mild form of
political participation. They offer city residents representation but not voice,
consideration but not deliberation. This is obviously true of smartphone
applications like Waze and Strava Metro, which people use with no policy
motivations in mind. However, it is also true of policy-oriented applications
such as Street Bump, which provide people with the opportunity to influence
city affairs directly and purposefully, but only in a technical, semi-automatic
manner.
311-like applications are somewhat different in that they are more openended and allow citizens greater control over the information and, no less
importantly, the specific message that they transfer to the authorities.
Theoretically speaking, city residents could use these applications to express
their views on a variety of municipal issues and offer their personal policy
advice. In practice, however, it is doubtful that local authorities currently
have the technical capacity to conduct systematic large-scale analyses of such
complex data. Until such capacities become operational, 311 applications
are unlikely to provide a platform for meaningful political participation
through big data.172
Sure enough, personal sensors offer no better opportunities for people to
engage in public deliberation over urban affairs. In fact, when local
authorities rely on personal sensors to inform policymaking, the very
particular role they assign to people is to be device carriers, demonstrating
anything but respect for their capacities as rational agents. This situation
seems to perfectly realize Arendt’s concerns about the rise of machines and
the objectification of human beings.173 It also seems safe to assume that
Arendt would have been uncomfortable with the widespread use of public
sensors that are installed on street poles and which communicate information
to policymakers, quite literally, over people’s heads, giving them no role
whatsoever in the policymaking process.
Second, smart city projects of the kind discussed above are likely to have
an exclusionary effect on socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. A
smartphone application like Waze, Strava Metro, Street Bump, or 311 can
only be used by people who own a smartphone and have downloaded and
know how to operate the application. Since people with limited financial
resources and poor technological or civic orientation are less likely than
others to be such,174 lower-class neighborhoods may not equally benefit from
172
173
174

See infra notes 214–18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
It has been observed, for example, that leisure and sport cyclists tend to use the Strava Metro
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the services that municipal authorities provide and from the policies that they
adopt on the basis of data retrieved from mobile applications.
When it comes to environmental sensors, the reasons for the
underrepresentation of socioeconomically disadvantaged populations are
somewhat different and are not necessarily connected with the “digital
divide.” Unlike big data projects that draw information from mobile phone
applications in an apparently random bottom-up manner, projects that rely
on environmental sensors are more likely to be controlled from above. This
is true for public sensors that local authorities directly install and operate,
and it may also be true for personal sensors if the authorities allocate them to
a selected group of residents. In these cases, local officials might distribute
sensors in an unequal manner, awarding higher priority to identifying the
environmental needs of wealthier residents, which usually have greater
influence on local politics.175 For example, in Chicago’s Array of Things
project, the location of more than a hundred nodes have already been
determined. A close examination reveals that hardly any nodes are currently
installed or planned to be installed in the city’s poorer neighborhoods.176
This example demonstrates that when the authorities themselves control the
production of big data, they might reproduce the exclusionary patterns that
often characterize traditional policymaking processes.
It has been noted above that disadvantaged populations who have a
relatively small influence on big data-based health policymaking are usually
the ones who have the greatest interest in public health policy. Apparently,
the same is true of those excluded from big data-based urban planning.177

175

176

177

application more than people who ride their bikes to work, and that people who live in Manhattan
are two to three times more likely to report disturbances through New York City’s 311 application
than their poorer neighbors in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. See Rueb, supra note 168; Walker,
supra note 159.
This tendency of government agents to award higher priority to the interests of more powerful
groups within their constituencies has been extensively discussed in public choice literature. See,
e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 34–35 (7th prtg. 1977) (explaining why small, well-organized interest groups have
considerable influence over public decision-makers); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372 (1983) (explaining why government
agents promote policies that they believe to be favored by powerful constituencies).
See Array of Things Locations, CITY OF CHI.: DATA PORTAL, https://data.cityofchicago.org/
Environment-Sustainable-Development/Array-of-Things-Locations/6rq2-yx28/data
(last
updated Dec. 20, 2018) (providing a list of the locations of 111 nodes); Census Data—Selected
Socioeconomic Indicators in Chicago, 2008–2012, CITY OF CHI.: DATA PORTAL,
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Health-Human-Services/Census-Data-Selected-socioeconomicindicators-in-C/kn9c-c2s2 (last updated Sept. 12, 2014) (drawing on national census data to rank
Chicago’s neighborhoods (community areas) according to selected socioeconomic indicators); Node
Location Map, ARRAY OF THINGS, https://arrayofthings.github.io/node-locations.html (presenting
the first phase’s nodes on the city map) (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 153, at 8 (noting that the “[c]hallenges faced
by Americans living in cities . . . . are often intensified for those who are poor, disabled, young,
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Poorer people who live in poorer neighborhoods usually suffer more from
noise, air pollution, and other annoyances, and are more dependent on
publicly funded services to address these impediments.178 However, if the
provision of public services is determined to a large extent by big data
analysis, these people are the least likely to enjoy them, in both the short and
the longer term.
IV. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL AND
INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION?
The upshot of the previous Parts is that there is a significant gap between
the alleged participatory potential of big data-based policymaking and its
actual impact on public engagement in political decision-making. On the
one hand, big data technologies allow government officials to take into
account much more information about many more people than they ever
could before, and thus to adopt directives, regulations, and general policies
that are more responsive to the needs and interests of greater segments of the
population. On the other hand, big data can only represent people’s needs
in a superficial and schematic manner, and it cannot offer them real voice or
meaningful deliberation. In addition, big data’s inclusiveness seems to end
at the doorstep of socioeconomically disadvantaged populations who do not
produce relevant digital data.
This Part sets out to examine whether constitutional law can have a role
in reducing the gap between the promise and reality of political participation
through big data. Section IV.A suggests that the First Amendment may be
understood to place upon public authorities that rely on big data analysis a
duty to ensure that it does not deny people the opportunity to express and
discuss their views in a meaningful way. Section IV.B suggests that the
Fourteenth Amendment may be understood to place upon the same
authorities a duty to ensure that all those potentially affected by their
decisions, including members of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups,
have an equal opportunity to participate. Both sections discuss concrete
measures that the government can take to dispose of these purported
constitutional duties.

178

alone, or aged” and that “[t]hese same disadvantaged groups also often have the least opportunity
to take direct advantage of new technologies”).
See, e.g., Edmund Yet Wah Seto et al., Spatial Distribution of Traffic Induced Noise Exposures in a US City:
An Analytic Tool for Assessing the Health Impacts of Urban Planning Decisions, 6 INT’L J. HEALTH
GEOGRAPHICS 24 (2007) (finding that in San Francisco, the risk of annoyance from urban noise
varies considerably between neighborhoods).
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A. Mild Participation and the First Amendment
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention the right of citizens to
participate in political or public affairs. In fact, even the narrower right to
vote in periodic elections, which is a core component of the right to political
participation,179 is only indirectly embedded in the Constitution.180 It could
be argued, however, that in view of its centrality to the Founding Fathers’
legal and political vision, the right to political participation should
nonetheless be understood to underlie American constitutional law and
should inspire the interpretation of various constitutional norms.181
But how exactly did the Constitution’s Framers conceive of the right to
political participation? What was the content and scope of this right in their
vision? For the Framers, the main purpose of political participation was to
ensure that the government promotes the common good of the citizenry and
refrains from using its power in an abusive or arbitrary manner.182 This goal
apparently implied a rather narrow conception of political participation,
which focused on the right to vote. As James Madison explains in The
Federalist No. 39,
It is essential to [the] government that [its power] be derived from the great
body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class
of it . . . . It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering
it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people . . . .”183

According to Madison, the participation of a large body of voters in elections
provides both a necessary and sufficient guarantee that the citizens will
choose their representatives according to the latter’s ability to promote the
public good—that is, according to their civic virtue—rather than on the basis
of their affiliation with some factionist interests.184 At the same time, the
periodic nature of elections ensures that representatives remain accountable

179

180
181
182

183
184

See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77, 99–
100 (1988) (distinguishing between “thin” conceptions of political participation, which view
elections as a “near-sufficient form of political participation,” and “strong” conceptions of political
participation, which argue for an ongoing right to take part in the conduct of public affairs in
various non-electoral ways that supplement voting).
See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote on
account of race, sex, or age or due to a failure to pay a poll tax).
See infra notes 188–95 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 35, at 31 (noting that the Framers adhered to a republican conception
according to which politics consists of self-rule by citizens willing to subordinate their factional
interests to the general good).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The Federalist No.
39 is cited in Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1548 n.41.
Madison’s idea is that in large constituencies each representative is chosen by a large number of
citizens with diverse interests, and therefore there are fewer chances that “unworthy candidates”
will be able to offer their supporters selective benefits. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 183,
at 82 (James Madison).
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to their constituencies, who will be able to replace them in case they turn
against the public interest.185
In the Framers’ vision, once they are elected, the representatives should
make decisions through a deliberative process that helps them discern the
common good of the society and find the best ways to pursue it. This
deliberative process takes place within the representative body, without
involving the public. According to the Framers, such internal deliberation
may yield decisions that are “more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves,” for the wisdom of the representatives
“may best discern the true interest of their country,” and their “patriotism
and love of justice” will make them “least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
or partial considerations.”186
The constitutional framework envisioned by the Framers thus appears to
have an elitist bent. It assigns the task of governing to the most virtuous
persons, whereas the role of citizens is largely confined to identifying these
persons and choosing them as their representatives.187 Some scholars
suggest, however, that a careful examination of the Framers’ work and of the
historical context in which they operated reveals that their conception of civic
participation was broader than it initially seems. These scholars observe that
the Framers were heavily influenced by republican ideals, which assign
citizens a greater role in politics than mere participation in elections.188
Classic republicanism views dialogue and discussion among the citizenry as
crucial for discerning the common good as well as for inculcating civic virtue

185

186

187

188

THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 183, at 241 (James Madison) (noting that elected
representatives should be “holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good
behavior”). In addition to general periodic elections, the Framers made sure to include in the
Constitution other mechanisms that would constrain the power of the government, such as the
separation of powers and the protection of individual liberties.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 183, at 82 (James Madison). Madison further observes that:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the
society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 183, at 350 (James Madison). Both sources are cited in
Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 35, at 41.
See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 20 (1986) (explaining that the assertion that “there is a natural aristocracy of talent, for
whom the tasks of government should, in everyone’s interest, be reserved,” may be seen as elitist).
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1013
(1984); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493–94 (1988); Michelman, supra
note 187, at 18–19; Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1539; Sunstein, supra note 35, at 31–32. One of the
purposes of the “Republican Revival” in constitutional legal scholarship was to refute the
assumption that the Constitution’s Framers were exclusively influenced by classic liberalism or
pluralism. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1695, 1695–96 (1989).
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and enhancing individual self-realization.189 It therefore asserts that
“political participation should be active and frequent and not limited to
voting.”190 As Cass Sunstein explains, these republican principles were not
fully or coherently endorsed by the Founding Fathers.191 However, they did
play an important role in the constitutional framing process,192 and they
should and do continue to inspire contemporary constitutional doctrine and
interpretation.193
Most notably, the republican ideal of participatory politics finds
expression in the First Amendment, which enshrines, inter alia, the freedom
of speech and the press, the right to peaceably assemble, and the right to
petition the government.194 By protecting these freedoms from abridgement
by the federal and state governments,195 this Amendment arguably
establishes the basic conditions for authentic public deliberation, which
cannot take place unless people are free to express their views.196 According
to this reading, the main purpose of the Framers in adopting this amendment
was to facilitate informal public deliberation that takes place in the streets, in
town squares, in the press, and through lobbies and petitions, and which
complements the internal deliberations that take place within official

189
190
191
192

193

194

195

196

See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V.
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7, 23 (8th ed. 2017).
Id. at 7.
See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1558–60.
Sunstein explains that republican ideas were more strongly advocated by the Anti-federalists than
by the Federalists. However, important elements of republican thought can also be found in the
views of the Federalists. See id. at 1547.
See id. at 1540 (noting that “[r]epublican thought played a central role in the framing period, and it
offers a powerful conception of politics and of the functions of constitutionalism,” and that “[t]he
characteristically republican belief in deliberative democracy continues to influence . . . legal
doctrine”). According to Sunstein, the republican ideal of deliberative democracy finds its
expression in the American constitutional framework, inter alia, in the adoption of a federal system
that provides opportunities for local self-determination at the state level, as well as in the right to a
jury trial, which is valued in the republican tradition as a “means of inculcating civic virtue and
promoting participation.” Id. at 1562 & n.128; see also Michelman, supra note 187, at 23 (noting
that “the republican tradition of civic dialogue retains a strong, if somewhat disguised and twisted,
hold on American constitutional imagination”).
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1550 (asserting that “[t]he requirement of deliberation embodies
substantive limitations” such as the protection of the freedom of speech); Cass R. Sunstein, The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1762 (1994) (“The Madisonian model sees the right of
free expression as a key part of the system of public deliberation.”).
The text of the First Amendment only refers to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
However, this amendment has been applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1941); Schneider v. State,
308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1551.
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government institutions.197
The first to offer a comprehensive account of the deliberative foundations
of the First Amendment was Alexander Meiklejohn.198 Considering the First
Amendment within the historical context of its adoption and taking into
account “the intention and structure of the Constitution as a whole,”
Meiklejohn asserts that the main purpose of this amendment is to preserve
the self-governing powers of the people.199 According to this view, the First
Amendment “protects the freedom of those activities of thought and
communication by which we [the people] ‘govern.’ It is concerned, not with
a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.”200
As Meiklejohn explains, “[i]n the specific language of the Constitution, the
governing activities of the people appear only in terms of casting a ballot”;
however, “in the deeper meaning of the Constitution, voting is merely the
external expression of a wide and diverse number of activities by means of
which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities . . . which [the] freedom
to govern lays upon them.”201
According to Meiklejohn, these
responsibilities include, first, understanding the challenges that face the
nation; second, passing judgment upon the decisions that the government
makes to address those challenges; and third, devising methods whereby such
decisions can become wiser and more effective.202
Meiklejohn’s assertion that the main purpose of the First Amendment is
to secure public engagement in governance has been endorsed by the
Supreme Court in several cases, most famously in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.203 In this case, the Court reversed a decision to award damages to a
public officer following the publication of a defamatory advertisement in the
New York Times, which criticized his official conduct.204 The Court asserted
197
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200
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See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 187, at 54 (suggesting that the First Amendment can be understood
to envision “actual” political participation, whose “main arena is not the formal legislative assembly,
but rather a dispersed and continuous process of political discussion among coconstituents, and
between them and their representatives”); see also id. at 57.
See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that there are two different types of freedom of speech); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (arguing that the First
Amendment is not absolute).
See Meiklejohn, supra note 198, at 253–254.
Id. at 255. This reading of the First Amendment may be contrasted with readings that emphasize its
contribution to individual liberty and autonomy. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and
the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 294 (1981) (putting forth the “unity
thesis,” which suggests that “means and ends are necessarily united in the process of change”).
See Meiklejohn, supra note 198, at 255.
Id.
376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between Meiklejohn’s
thesis and the New York Times case, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256, 292.
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that in view of the political nature of the defamatory publication, the freedom
of speech and the press must be granted particularly strong protection.205 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked Madison’s statement that “the
Constitution created a form of government under which ‘[t]he people . . .
possess the absolute sovereignty,’”206 and that in such a system “the censorial
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government
over the people.”207 These statements, according to the Court, revealed that
the “central meaning of the First Amendment”208 was to provide “ample
opportunity for the people to determine and resolve public issues.”209 In
subsequent First Amendment cases, the Court reaffirmed the New York Times
principle that public speech (as opposed to private or commercial speech)
deserves particularly robust—in fact, almost absolute—protection, because
such speech “is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment.”210
Taking the proposition that the main purpose of the First Amendment is
to enable authentic public deliberation and thereby promote meaningful
political participation a step further, it could be argued that this Amendment
entails not only that the government should refrain from imposing any
constraints upon political speech, but also that, in some cases, it should take
active measures to ensure that free political speech actually takes place. The
idea that a “Madisonian” reading of the First Amendment may call for its
interpretation as incorporating both negative and positive elements is not
new. About fifty years ago, in the heyday of “traditional” mass media,
Jerome Barron famously argued that the First Amendment places upon the
government a duty to ensure that private broadcasting and newspaper
companies offer a stage for a variety of competing views and ideas.211 In
recent years it has been suggested that similar requirements should be
applied to the new media giants, subjecting them to neutrality principles and
limiting their ability to exclusively control any particular segment of internet

205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id. at 270–71. The Court endorses here the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 302 (citing WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41 (1958)).
See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
The Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in the Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission when it upheld the right of the government to regulate broadcasting rights
such that license holders would have to devote some airtime to presenting controversial issues of
public importance from a variety of perspectives. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969). However, the Court stopped short of asserting that the
government had a duty to apply such regulations. See id.
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infrastructure or services.212
So far, the idea that the First Amendment may place a positive obligation
upon the government to facilitate political speech has only been examined in
the context of the government’s alleged responsibility to regulate the activity
of media companies. However, there seems to be no reason why some
positive obligations concerning the freedom of speech should not apply
directly to the government. According to this view, in order to realize the
deliberative goals of the First Amendment, federal and state agencies should
be required to offer adequate opportunities to affected citizens to express
their opinions with respect to certain policy issues.
Of course, such requirements already apply to government agencies in
some cases, most notably when they consider adopting new rules or repealing
existing ones. In these situations, the Administrative Procedure Act requires
federal agencies to publish a notice of the proposed rule and to give interested
persons an opportunity to submit written comments.213 Similar requirements
can be found in many state laws. However, according to the common
understanding, these notice and comment requirements are not mandated
by the Constitution, and there is no constitutional obligation upon federal or
state agencies to pursue similar procedures when they make decisions that do
not involve rulemaking.
By contrast, if the First Amendment is understood to place positive
obligations upon government agencies, then providing opportunities to the
public to participate in policymaking processes in a meaningful, deliberative
way may be a matter of constitutional duty. A full examination of the
possible implications of such a duty for different types of policymaking by
different agencies, and of the specific requirements that it might entail in the
age of digital data, is beyond the scope of this Article. In the context of the
present study, suffice it to say that this interpretation of the First Amendment
seems to present two options for an agency that uses big data analysis to guide
its decisions on controversial matters of significant public interest.
The first option is to attempt to employ big data analysis in a manner that
creates opportunities for the public to express diverse opinions and engage
in meaningful discussion concerning the relevant policy issues. The
employment of big data analysis in such a deliberative manner depends,
among other things, on the availability of advanced machine learning
algorithms that can process complex natural language texts. Such algorithms
212
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See, e.g., Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a First Amendment
Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1581 (2007) (arguing that antitrust and intellectual property law
should be applied to the new media in a manner that promotes free speech); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron’s Contextual First Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 953 (2008).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
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may allow for the automatic analysis of people’s comments on public
affairs.214 Arguably, a governmental commitment to facilitating broad yet
deliberative public involvement in policymaking—especially if backed by a
legal obligation—can enhance the development of such technological
capacities.215 This does not mean that once such technologies are developed,
government agencies should only use big data analysis in a deliberative
manner. They may well rely on technical data that people produce passively
or automatically to inform their policies. However, they may not rely
exclusively on such technical data.
The second option is to complement big data analysis by other methods
of public participation that allow for meaningful deliberation, such as face-toface or online consultations with those who have a special interest in the policy
issues at stake. Such parallel employment of quantitative and qualitative
participation methods can satisfy free speech requirements until such time as
big data analysis technologies allow for a better combination of the two.
B. Exclusion of Disadvantaged Groups and the Fourteenth Amendment
Reading the First Amendment as imposing positive duties upon the
government may also bear implications for the problem of exclusion from
big data. This reading suggests that, to the extent that the government uses
big data as a platform for public deliberation, it must ensure that all those
affected have access to this platform. However, as implied above, even if at
some point government agencies begin to use big data in a deliberative
manner, relying on advanced machine learning technologies, they will
probably do so only with respect to contested policy issues that involve
considerable human discretion. In other cases, they are likely to use big data
in a technical, non-deliberative manner, taking advantage of the massive
amount of digital data that is already out there. The contribution of technical
data to governmental analysis is thus likely to be a major way of influencing
public policy, which should be open to everyone. The First Amendment, of
214
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See, e.g., WP BrandStudio, Future-proof: How Today’s Artificial Intelligence Solutions are Taking Government
Services to the Next Frontier, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
brand-connect/wp/2017/08/22/accenture/future-proof/?noredirect=on (cited in Benvenisti,
supra note 14, at 62 n.295).
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services has recently tested a machine
learning tool that can automatically process public comments on proposed regulations. The
purpose of the project was to increase the efficiency of informal rulemaking procedures mandated
by the Administrative Procedure Act. See supra note 213 and accompanying text; see also Office of
the Chief Tech. Officer, Increasing Efficiency in Rule Making with Natural Language Processing, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/cto/projects/increasing-efficiency-in-rulemaking-with-natural-language-processing/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (stating that HHS
Idea Labs project aimed to increase the efficiency of processing public comments) (cited in
Benvenisti, supra note 14, at 62 n.296).
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course, cannot be invoked to establish a right to participate in nondeliberative big data analysis, for the provision of blood test results or cycling
data to the government has nothing to do with free speech. Instead, the most
relevant source for asserting a right to be included in governmental big data
analysis seems to be the Equal Protection Clause, which applies to state
governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to the federal
government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment.216
According to its prevailing interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits governmental authorities from purposefully treating similarly
situated persons differently.217 A court is most likely to find that this
prohibition has been violated when it employs a strict or heightened level of
scrutiny, which is the case when the group allegedly discriminated against is
considered a protected class.218 Of course, the decision of the court as to
whether a violation has occurred depends on various factors, including the
existence of a public interest that could justify disparate treatment.219
However, even without delving into these factors, it seems safe to assume that
under the prevailing interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, exclusion
from big data is unlikely to be deemed unconstitutional, for two main reasons.
First, antidiscrimination jurisprudence has been reluctant to recognize
socioeconomically disadvantaged people as members of a protected or quasiprotected class.220 Although socioeconomic marginalization in general, and
216

217

218

219
220

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This Equal
Protection Clause only applies to state and local governments. However, the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V;
see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (holding that discrimination by the federal
government may be violative of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976) (holding that in order to establish a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, a claimant must show that discrimination was intentional, and
noting that a disparate outcome in itself does not automatically prove discrimination); see also Akins
v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1945) (emphasizing that discrimination must be intentional).
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end.”). There is, however, no clear definition of what constitutes a
protected class. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1542 (2004) (“American
antidiscrimination law has no determinate criteria for deciding what practices are group-based
classifications, and while courts sometimes articulate such criteria, they often apply them
inconsistently . . . .”); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135,
138 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has not provided a coherent explanation for precisely what factors
trigger heightened scrutiny.”).
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985).
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that poverty is not a suspect classification); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (asserting
that financial need alone does not identify a suspect class); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (explaining that people living in poor districts are not a protected
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exclusion from big data in particular, often coincides with characteristics that
otherwise establish protected classes, such as race, ethnicity, and gender,221
these characteristics cannot be said to distinguish big data outsiders as a
group. Instead, big data outsiders represent a “large, diverse, and
amorphous class” to which equal protection guarantees are rarely applied.222
Second, in most cases, it would be hard to infer a discriminatory intent
from the fact that socioeconomically disadvantaged people contribute to big
data less than others. As we have seen, governmental authorities often
harvest big data from a wide range of sources over which they do not have
full control. It makes little sense to claim that the health authorities choose
to collect medical data from EHRs or social sites because poor people do not
have adequate access to these sources, or that urban planners collect data
from mobile applications or from personal sensor kits precisely for this
reason. Even when the authorities are involved in the unequal distribution
or installation of sensors or other devices from which they hope to collect big
data, they do not necessarily do so with the intention to discriminate. Indeed,
the problem with big data-based policies is not that they intentionally ignore
the needs of poorer or older populations, but rather that they fail to
acknowledge the economic, socio-psychological, and cultural constraints that
prevent these populations from producing big data in the same amount as
better-off groups.
It seems, then, that the existing equal protection doctrine, which requires
an intentional disparate treatment of protected groups in order to establish
unlawful discrimination, cannot pave the way for the inclusion of
socioeconomically disadvantaged populations in big data. As is well known,
the disparate treatment doctrine has been criticized by many academics and
civil rights advocates who have suggested that the Equal Protection Clause
should be understood to prohibit not only intentional disparate treatment but

221
222

class because they are “not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); cf. Henry Rose, The Poor as a
Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407,
417–18 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez
has been misunderstood and that, in fact, the Court has not yet decided whether the poor are a
quasi-suspect or suspect class). The term “quasi-protected class” refers to “a class of individuals
who lack political power and have been subjected to purposeful, intentional discrimination to a
lesser degree than individuals in a fully suspect class.” See Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place Is
Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 508 (2003).
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28; see also Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National
Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (noting that “equal protection has been less potent in
addressing disadvantage . . . that affects a diffuse or amorphous class”); Lerman, supra note 57, at
60 (citing Liu, supra, at 334).
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also unintentional disparate impact.223 According to this approach,
governmental practices that are neutral on their face but have a
disproportionately adverse impact on protected classes should also be
considered unconstitutional.224 Unlike the disparate treatment standard,
which focuses on the formal classifications underlying particular
governmental decisions, disparate impact is concerned with the actual effects
of the ongoing subordination of historically disempowered groups.225 Had
this standard been adopted by the Supreme Court, big data-based
governmental policies that disfavor socioeconomically disadvantaged
populations might have been deemed unconstitutional.226 For although big
data is perfectly neutral on its face and seems to provide an Arendtian mask
that denies discriminatory classifications,227 it can actually perpetuate the
underrepresentation and political subordination of historically
disadvantaged groups.
Another somewhat speculative constitutional solution to the problem of
big data exclusion may be found in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which precedes the Equal Protection Clause.228
This Clause, which provides that states shall not abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States, grants some entitlements to
all citizens of the United States and asserts that states must respect these
entitlements.229 However, the content and scope of these entitlements are
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and have been the subject of
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See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 968 (1993) (contending that “the Davis rule reflects a
distinctively white way of thinking about race”); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049, 1052, 1054–57 (1978) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s focus on discriminatory intent);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (asserting that “requiring proof of conscious or intentional
motivation as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores
much of what we understand about how the human mind works”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection
No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1131 (1997)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause authorizes
state action that perpetuates historic forms of race and gender stratification).
See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 701, 708 (2006)
(observing that disparate impact theorists are concerned with the perpetuation of past lawful
discrimination through what appear to be neutral practices).
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976)
(arguing that the approach that focuses on formal classifications is highly individualistic and does
not take social reality fully into account).
See Lerman, supra note 57, at 57, 61–62 (arguing that a new big data antisubordination doctrine
may be needed to protect the persons whom the big data revolution risks sidelining).
See supra notes 106–11, 115–16, and accompanying text.
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id.
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much controversy.230 In the 1872 Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause very narrowly, rejecting the
view that it protects all the basic rights of U.S. citizens against infringement
by the states, and instead holding that it secures only a limited number of
rights that “owe their existence to the Federal government,” such as the right
to interstate travel and the right to use the nation’s navigable waters.231
According to the Court’s reading, the Clause preserves rather than limits
state authority over civil rights, subjecting it only to “an anemic and eclectic
array”232 of external rights that stem directly from federal citizenship.
Following the Slaughter-House decision, which was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in subsequent cases,233 the Privileges or Immunities Clause has lain
nearly dormant for 145 years,234
However, although Slaughter-House remains on the books, many legal
scholars maintain, along with the minority judges in Slaughter-House, that this
decision represents a flawed interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.235 According to these critics, the Clause was meant to protect against
state abridgement of a broader list of substantive rights than Slaughter-House

230

231
232
233

234

235

See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 98
(1980) (noting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “is quite inscrutable, indicating only that
there should exist some set of constitutional entitlements not explicitly enumerated in the
document”); Emily Jennings, Let’s All Agree to Disagree, and Move On: Analyzing Slaughter-House and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause Under “Sunk Cost” Principles, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1803, 1806–15 (2013) (detailing the disagreements among legal historians with respect to the
intention of the drafters of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75, 78–80 (1873).
Goodwin Liu, supra note 222, at 354.
In the few cases since Slaughter-House where petitioners attempted to expand the scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court refused to revive it. See, e.g., McDonald v. City
of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030–31 (2010) (refusing to assert that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
required states to respect the right to bear arms, and preferring to apply this duty to states through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551–
53 (1875) (holding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to peaceably
assemble to petition state policies).
As Alexander M. Bickel has observed, the Slaughter-House decision “just about read the privileges
and immunities clause out of the Constitution.” See Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American
Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 378 (1973).
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83, 96–101 (Field, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the
majority’s interpretation of the Clause made it a “vain and idle enactment, which accomplished
nothing,” and suggesting instead that it was meant to expand the protections provided by the
Comity Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution); id. at 111, 118–119 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (opining that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to secure the federal
rights enumerated in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights against state infringement). See generally
Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1295 (2009) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates the Bill of Rights); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) (same);
Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance
Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV. L & POL. 1 (1998) (same).
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recognized.236 More specifically, some critics suggest that, read together with
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,237 the Privileges or
Immunities Clause should be understood to guarantee the equal right of all
citizens of the United States to enjoy the benefits of national citizenship
regardless of their state of residence.238 According to Goodwin Liu, this
guarantee of equal national citizenship places a duty upon both state
governments and the federal government to secure for all citizens “full
membership [and] effective participation . . . in the national community.”239
Liu and other legal historians find evidence in the debates that surrounded
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and in contemporaneous legal
doctrine and commentary that the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause were intended to “encompass[ ] substantive rights
necessary to make citizenship meaningful and effective.”240 The Framers
understood, however, that “citizenship was an evolving concept” and
therefore chose to employ the “broad language of ‘Privileges or Immunities’”
that would “enable future generations . . . to develop further the privileges
and immunities of citizenship.”241
If we accept the propositions that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
intended to secure equal citizenship and effective participation in political life
and that the exact meaning of these guarantees should be determined in
accordance with the realities of a given period, we can argue that in the
second decade of the twenty-first century, this Clause protects the right of all
citizens to equal representation in big data that shapes public policy.242 We
can also argue that this right is enforceable against both state (and local)
governments and the federal government, and that it places upon them an
236

237
238
239
240

241

242

See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the
Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 313–14 (2000) (asserting that there is considerable
evidence that the Framers intended the Privileges or Immunities to apply very broadly and to
“encompass all fundamental human rights and link those rights to national citizenship”).
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., Liu, supra note 222, at 354; Zietlow, supra note 236, at 307–33.
Liu, supra note 222, at 335
Id. at 357; see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory
of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 739 (2003) (“Evidence from the Ratification debates and
contemporaneous legal doctrine indicates that the framers viewed the meaning of federal
citizenship very broadly and that the rights that adhered to citizenship were considerably broader
than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”).
James W. Fox Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787–1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 504 (1999);
see Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST.
COMMENT. 235, 274–75 (1994) (“[T]he framers realized . . . that the amendment’s precise content
in some sense was in the hands of future generations.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 923–26 (1986).
Goodwin Liu reaches a similar conclusion with respect to equal opportunities in education, arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes and obligates Congress to ensure a meaningful floor of
educational opportunity throughout the nation. See Liu, supra note 222, at 335.
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affirmative duty to promote big data equality.243 Given the fact that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause has drawn far less judicial attention than the
Equal Protection Clause, it may be easier for courts and governmental
authorities to adopt a broad interpretation of the former that encompasses
big data equality than to admit the illegality of big data’s disparate impact
under the latter.
Assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment—by virtue of either the
Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause—requires
that big data-based policymaking be inclusive of all segments of the
population, what should state and federal authorities do to meet this
requirement? At the least, it seems, they need to address the two basic
dimensions of the digital divide, namely, physical access and mental skills.244
This means, first, that government authorities should make every effort to
ensure that the digital sources from which they collect big data are accessible
to everyone. For example, a local authority that relies on data produced by
personal smart-city sensor kits to address noise and air pollution could offer
such sensors for free to those who cannot afford to purchase them. Or, if the
authority collects data from stationary sensors that it installs in public places,
it should make sure that the sensors are distributed evenly across town.
Similarly, if health authorities wish to harvest medical data from personal
health monitors, they should make sure that the cost of the latter does not
prevent potential participants from using them. Of course, in some cases it
may be more complicated to expand access to digital sources. For example,
to ensure equal representation in EHRs may take a fundamental reform in
federal health insurance coverage, which does not seem feasible at this
time.245 It may be possible, however, to find alternative ways to collect data
relating to the medical needs of uninsured persons and to take it into account
when shaping health policies. Second, government authorities should
develop and implement programs to facilitate diverse uses of digital platforms
by all citizens. These programs should help people acquire the technical
skills that allow them to produce digital data, and they should also raise
awareness of the potential policy implications of producing such data, so as
243
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Many
commentators assert that the enforcement power granted to the Congress in Section 5 also places
upon it an obligation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. See, e.g., Farber & Muench, supra note 241, at 236 (“The fourteenth amendment was
intended to bridge the gap between positive law and higher law by empowering the national
government to protect the natural rights of its citizens.”); Liu, supra note 222, at 335; William J.
Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 153, 159 (2002) (arguing that Congress should enforce the privileges or immunities of
citizenship); Zietlow, supra note 236, at 310 (“[T]he Citizenship Clause also invokes the power of
the federal government to protect the rights that adhere to federal citizenship.”).
See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
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to allow people to make informed choices about their digital activities. In
addition to taking active measures to promote inclusiveness, government
authorities should make sure to abide by transparency principles that allow
those affected by big data-based policymaking to know, to the extent possible,
which data was used, how it was collected, and from whom.
As noted above, much of the digital data that government authorities
employ to inform policymaking is originally collected by private entities (e.g.,
medical clinics, health insurers, internet giants, and mobile software
developers) for their own non-policy-oriented purposes. Hence, in order to
ensure that the data that they analyze is inclusive, government authorities
may have to place some inclusiveness requirements upon those private data
providers. These entities can be required to facilitate access to certain
services that they provide, which are of potential use to policymakers. They
can also be required to actively encourage disengaged populations to use
digital technology in a manner that has the potential to affect public policy,
for example by soliciting their inputs on public affairs or by nudging them to
produce other policy-relevant information. Finally, private data collectors
should also be subjected to transparency requirements that enable public
scrutiny of non-policy-oriented data used by the government. These
requirements may be softer than the ones that apply directly to the
government and may be subject to trade secret protection and other
exceptions. While all these regulatory measures, even if moderate, are likely
to meet with some resistance on the part of powerful private data collectors,
the experience of recent years shows that governmental attempts to regulate
the big data industry can nonetheless be effective. So far, such regulation has
mostly been designed to protect customer privacy and security,246 but there
seems to be no reason why regulatory efforts to promote the vital interest of
(and, arguably, the constitutional right to) data inclusiveness should not be
equally successful.
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See, e.g., Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (allowing
consumers to access their credit reports and prescribing measures to reduce the risk of identity
theft); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559
(2012) (creating a security framework for federal information systems); Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012) (regulating the online collection of personal
information from children under the age of thirteen); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012) (requiring healthcare entities to
secure the confidentiality of personal health information); Protecting the Privacy of Customers of
Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, Report and Order (Broadband Privacy
Order), 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,275 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64) (empowering
broadband consumers to decide how data is used and shared by broadband providers).
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CONCLUSION
The incorporation of big data analysis into public policymaking carries a
promise not only of enhanced accuracy and efficiency, but also of greater
political participation. In an ideal world, big data could allow all affected
citizens to have their voice heard in policymaking processes. In the real
world, however, big data fails to fulfill this potential. First, instead of
providing a platform through which people can convey their reasoned
opinions about contested policy questions, big data serves merely as a means
for the government to aggregate and analyze technical data about people’s
habits and conditions. Second, instead of functioning as a mask that covers
physical characteristics such as gender and race and thus allows people to
participate in collective decision-making on an equal basis, the apparent
neutrality of big data allows for the exclusion of disadvantaged populations
to go unnoticed, thereby reinforcing political inequalities.
Constitutional law can offer a normative framework for addressing these
deficits and reducing the gap between the promise and reality of big databased policymaking. This Article has presented a somewhat uncommon yet
plausible interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments that may
establish a constitutional right to meaningful and inclusive participation in
governmental big data analysis. This interpretation takes into account the
original intention of the Constitution’s Framers and the values that they
sought to promote, but at the same time it acknowledges the need to adapt
these values to contemporary political and technological circumstances.
Although this interpretation does not find full support in existing judicial
decisions, it may be adopted in the future when courts will have to face the
challenges that rapidly emerging big data applications pose to legal doctrine
created in the pre-big data era. If this happens, government authorities will
have to find ways to make big data-based policymaking more deliberative
and inclusive. The Article has proposed possible directions towards
accomplishing this task, which need to be further examined and refined
against real-life technological and political developments.

